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Introduction
Bassam Harik
Western Michigan University

The Tax Reform Act of 1986 has been called, among other
superlatives, a "legislative miracle" and an "historic achieve
ment." The Tax Act is certainly the most sweeping tax
legislation since the inception of the tax code in 1913. Even
though it received overwhelming support in Congress, the Tax
Act is not without its critics inside and outside Congress.
Some members of Congress felt that they had been railroaded
into voting under pressure on a bill that was negotiated
behind closed doors. Some of the other criticisms came from
the business sector, especially those businesses that, perceived
themselves to be adversely affected by the Tax Act.
One provision that threatened to undermine the tax bill
compromise was the cutback in deductions for individual
retirement accounts (IRAs): families with income exceeding
$50,000 and who are covered by employers' pension plans are
no longer eligible for deductions of contributions to IRAs.
Individuals not covered by employers' pension plans and
those whose income is less than $40,000 would still be able to
retain the full $2,000 deduction in contributions to IRAs.
Nonworking spouse deduction remains at $250. Reduced
deductions will be allowed for those with incomes between
$40,000 and $50,000. Nondeductible contributions up to
$2,000 with the deferred taxes on earnings still can be made by
those who are not allowed deductible IRAs. The tax conferees
resisted all attempts to introduce amendments dealing with
IRAs because they were afraid of opening the floodgates for
other amendments.
Another controversial provision was that dealing with
capital gains. Long-term capital gains are no longer given

preferential tax treatment, but are to be taxed at the same rate
as other income, i.e., a top rate of 33 percent. Supporters of
the provision say that maintaining a preferential rate would
unfairly benefit the rich who have already benefited from the
reduction of the top rate on income. Furthermore, this
simplifies the tax law and reduces the inefficiency which occurs
when individuals try to protect ordinary income by transform
ing it into long-term capital gains. Opponents of the provision
have argued that eliminating the historical preference will
discourage investment.
Unlike earlier versions that had dealt a sweeping blow to
most deductions, the bill that emerged retained most of the
popular deductions. Some of the major retained deductions
are mortgage interest payments on first and second homes,
and state and local income and property taxes. Business and
medical expenses are allowable if they exceed 2 percent and
7.5 percent respectively of a taxpayer's adjusted gross income.
Interest on consumer loans gradually will become nondeductible by 1991.
Tax shelters are to be eliminated. Taxpayers are no longer
able to offset ordinary income with passive paper losses.
Rather, they have to be active participants in partnerships in
order to claim any losses, and even then there is a limit on the
losses to be claimed. This provision made the reduction of the
top rate on income from 50 percent to 33 percent more
acceptable. Investment in oil and gas drilling operations,
however, has been exempted. The new rules will be completely
phased in by 1991.
With respect to businesses, the Act includes some major
changes, the ultimate impact of which is far from certain. At
first blush, it seems that businesses such as heavy industries
that rely heavily on the investment tax credit will be losers, as
will commercial real estate developers. Businesses in the

service sector and those that have been paying high effective
tax rates would be beneficiaries under the Tax Reform Act.
The preferential treatment currently given to oil and gas
producers was left almost intact.
Here are some of the provisions dealing with businesses. As
with individuals, there is a significant change in tax rates for
businesses. The top corporate tax rate has been dropped from
46 percent to 34 percent. There are two more brackets, 15
percent for income up to $50,000 and 25 percent for income
between $50,000 and $75,000. Here again, there is a 5 percent
tax surcharge for income between $75,000 and $100,000 and
the 34 percent rate will apply to all income when income
exceeds $100,000. The rate on corporate net capital gains has
been raised from 28 percent to 34 percent. This provision
benefits those businesses that have not been taking advantage
of the various tax breaks and are currently paying high
effective tax rates. These changes were completely phased in
by mid-1987.
The investment tax credit is to be repealed, and depreciation
allowances are to be reduced. These two provisions will have
an adverse effect on businesses investing heavily in plant and
equipment and on real estate developers. This is a far cry from
the 1981 tax breaks designed to favor these businesses.
Oil and gas producers have retained most of their tax
allowances under the bill. The cause of this industry was
helped by some influential key members of Congress, and by
the fact that the industry is in a depressed condition. It would
have been more difficult to plead the industry's case in the late
1970s when windfall profit taxes on oil companies were
popular.
In response to the public outcry over the fact that some
large and profitable corporations have sometimes paid little or

no taxes at all, the Act includes a new minimum tax on
businesses. The alternative minimum tax of 20 percent is
computed after adding back many of the tax breaks to taxable
income. The alternative minimum tax must be paid if it
exceeds the ordinary tax. This is similar to the alternative
minimum tax on individual earnings.
In other business-related areas, the Act extends the targetedjob credit for three years, and the research and development
tax credit is also extended for three years. Tax credits allowed
for rehabilitation of old buildings were reduced. The tax
incentive for construction of low-income housing has been
replaced by a generous new tax credit. Some changes in
allowable accounting practices are expected to raise tax
revenue. The Act also includes changes in the use of taxexempt bonds and foreign tax credits.
When President Reagan directed Treasury to study tax
overhaul in early 1984, the stated objectives were to achieve
simplicity, fairness, efficiency, and revenue-neutrality. Sim
plicity was given low priority soon after the overhaul process
started because it was judged incompatible with the other
objectives, although one could argue that having three tax
brackets for individuals instead of fourteen is simpler. In
chapter 2 of this volume, Joseph Stiglitz points out, however,
that looking up one's tax in the tax tables involves little work.
The Tax Reform Act rates higher on fairness. According to
Sheldon Danziger (chapter 6), the Act promotes horizontal
equity because of the expanded tax base and reduced number
of brackets. Even though it is estimated that about six million
poor and near-poor taxpayers will be removed from the tax
rolls, however, Danziger believes that this is not enough to
offset the large increases in poverty and inequality that have
taken place since 1973. In order to insure that high-income
individuals and corporations will pay some tax regardless of

allowed deductions, the Act includes an alternative minimum
tax. Stiglitz argues, however, that the prosperous firms will
not be greatly affected by the minimum tax because of leasing
provisions. Stiglitz also points out that shifting the tax burden
from individuals to corporations ignores the fact that it is
individuals who must bear the burden of taxation, and that it
violates the principle of political responsibility.
Lowering the top tax rates is expected to promote efficiency
and economic growth and to result in stronger incentives for
increased labor market participation. Eliminating the tax
avoidance schemes means that investments will be undertaken
for their own merit and not for their tax implications. One
should add that eliminating many of the investment tax
incentives might have a negative short-term effect on capital
formation. Joseph Minarik argues in chapter 3 that the
reduction of tax sheltering would redirect funds from unpro
ductive investments in tax-favored areas into more traditional
investment fields. Furthermore, Minarik states that reduced
tax rates and cutbacks of deductibility of interest on consumer
loans will decrease borrowing and modestly increase saving,
making more funds available for traditional investments.
Laurence Kotlikoff (chapter 4) argues that a reduction in
investment incentives results in a capital gain to owners of old
capital, which means that older generations will benefit and
young and middle-aged generations will be worse off because
they must pay higher prices to acquire capital stock. Taxing
capital gains at full rates will remove the most important form
of tax arbitrage. Stiglitz cautions, however, that raising the
maximum tax rate on capital gains from 20 percent to 33
percent may have serious consequences for efficiency.
Revenue-neutrality is supposed to have been achieved by
lowering the tax rates and expanding the tax base, and by
raising business tax revenues while lowering tax revenues from

individuals. Estimating changes in revenue as a result of tax
changes generally involves a great deal of guesswork. There
are uncertainties regarding the impact of lowering marginal
tax rates for individuals, boosting corporate profit taxes, and
eliminating preferential treatment for capital gains, to name a
few specific examples.
The five economists in this volume discuss the issues of
taxation and tax reform from different points of reference.
Stiglitz provides a general theoretical background for the
principles of taxation and the assessment of the impact of
taxation. He discusses at length how various tax policies lead
to tax arbitrage activities. He also points out that taxes on
capital assets are capitalized, and that individuals bear all
taxes. Among the principles of taxation, Stiglitz discusses the
principle that taxpayers should know what they are paying
"truth-in-government." Using the principles of taxation for
guidance, Stiglitz assesses the various tax reform proposals.
He concludes that the proposals ignore many of the principles
of taxation. Stiglitz gives his qualified support to the intro
duction of a value added tax, discussing both the merits and
drawbacks of such a tax. One can use the standards employed
by Stiglitz to evaluate the advantages and the shortcomings of
the new tax provisions.
Minarik looks at the impact of tax reform on investment
and growth. He points out that the roots of the recent tax
reform drive were in the Economic Recovery Tax Act (ERTA)
passed in 1981. Minarik argues that ERTA, with its Acceler
ated Cost Recovery System (ACRS) and the Investment Tax
Credit (ITC) provisions, has resulted in inconsistencies and
revenue reductions to the government, giving the impetus to
tax reform. Minarik further argues that, contrary to common
wisdom, ERTA was not instrumental in stimulating invest
ment. Investment subsidies, he contends, do not always

stimulate risk-taking and innovation. On the contrary, the
recent subsidies have encouraged low-risk tax shelters. Minarik also argues that the elimination of tax subsidies would
have no negative impact on investment in the long run.
In his paper, Kotlikoff discusses the impact of fiscal policy
on intergenerational redistribution of income. He discusses
the redistribution effects of income taxes, as well as the social
security tax system and government borrowing. He argues
that some of our current accounting definitions lead to "fiscal
illusion" in the way we view the budget deficit and the
national debt. Kotlikoff proposes redefining social security
"taxes" as "loans" since the contributors are lending money
to the government during their working years and receiving
benefit payments during retirement. He would also have the
government raise funds by levying a "head tax" with the
promise to repay the tax plus interest as a tax credit in the
future, instead of the present practice of selling bonds. Redef
initions such as these, according to Kotlikoff, would lead to
more relevant estimates of the budget deficit and the national
debt. Consequently, one could concentrate on the impact of
fiscal policy on intergenerational redistribution of income and
its effect on saving, growth and economic efficiency.
Ronald Fisher (chapter 5) examines tax reform from the
perspective of state and local governments. Since the paper
was presented before the passage of the new tax law, it
contained an analysis of the impact of the loss of deductibility
of state and local taxes on those governments. Even though
this is no longer an issue, the analysis itself stands of its own
and the conclusions are very interesting from a theoretical
point of view. Fisher concludes that any tax plan should be
judged on its aggregate impact rather than its impact on
specific sectors of the economy.
Danziger concentrates on the impact of tax reform on
poverty and income distribution. He argues that the policy of

helping the poor via economic growth has not been successful.
Policies such as ERTA have not had the desired effect on
income distribution or on alleviating poverty. He stresses that
tax reform should be and can be effectively used to aid the
poor. Danziger introduces some statistics showing a shift
towards greater poverty and inequality since the late seventies,
and explores possible explanations of these phenomena. He
then discusses the impact of the new tax law on the poor. In
order to correct the recent trend, Danziger proposes the
expansion of the current Earned Income Tax Credit and Per
Capita Refundable Credit that would replace the present
personal exemption. In discussing the merits of these propos
als, he argues that they offer efficient options for helping the
poor.
Like many tax changes in the past, the real impact of the
Tax Reform Act cannot be fully predicted. There will be some
unforeseen side effects; there will be pressures to rework some
of the provisions. Some urgent problems will be addressed by
tax revisions, but the bias will always be there. It is easier to
effect a policy through tax incentives and disincentives than
through appropriation or disappropriation. After all, this is
how our tax system got to be the monster that it is today.
There are still some unanswered questions with respect to the
impact of the Act on the foreign sector and on the value of the
dollar. The revenue-neutrality of the Act is based on estimates
and projections that are far from perfect. The issue of the
budget deficit has not been addressed by this Act.
It is hoped that this volume will provide some insight into
the complexity of the world of tax reform. History has shown
us that tax reform is an ongoing process and it does not end
with the signing of this specific legislation.
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Tax Reform:
Theory and Practice
Joseph E. Stiglitz
Princeton University

Each year, as April 15 approaches, we are forced to spend
some moments thinking about our income tax system. There
is, and has been, a great deal of dissatisfaction with our
system. There is a general consensus that others are paying
less than their fair share.
Popular concern has focused on the inequities and complex
ities of the system. Economists' concerns have been centered
not only on these matters, but also on the inefficiencies to
which our tax system allegedly gives rise.
The dissatisfaction has been so great that President Reagan
made tax reform one of the highest priority items in his
agenda for his second term. In spite of the importance he
attached to it, there has not yet been a tax reform bill as of this
writing. But by now, the outlines of what is likely to pass
and there is a consensus that a bill will pass has emerged. It
is not the tax reform bill that President Reagan had hoped
would lead to the Second American Revolution. It is certainly
not the tax reform bill about which economists had dreamed.
Why and to what extent do I think the bill which is likely to
emerge will represent a failure of the movement to reform our
income tax system? What lessons can we learn from this
seeming failure of reform? What implications does it have for
how the government should raise the revenues required to
finance its operations? These are the questions which I shall
address this evening. First, however, I should like to review
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some of the economists' traditional principles concerning tax
design and some facts concerning the consequence of a tax
system.

Some Basic Propositions Concerning the Effects of
Taxation
There are five basic facts concerning the consequences of a
tax system I should like to mention.
First, the inefficiencies associated with a tax system what
economists' call the dead weight loss of the tax system are
associated with the marginal tax rates, the extra tax an
individual pays for the extra dollar of income. This determines
the extent to which the tax system distorts the decision of
whether to work more, to retire later, to stay in school longer,
or to save more. 1 Our tax system has been criticized for its
high marginal tax rates, though the levels today are far lower
than they were some years ago.
Second, any tax system that taxes different incomes
whether income to different individuals or income received in
different forms opens itself to the possibility of what we call
tax arbitrage, the attempt to change the form in which
transactions occur, or to engage in transactions the purpose of
which is to reduce total tax liabilities. Let me illustrate.
Because capital gains are taxed at a lower rate than
ordinary income, there is an incentive for individuals to
attempt to reap their returns in the form of capital gains. In an
inflationary period, real estate values are often much higher
than the depreciated basis of an asset. If an individual who is
at a low income tax bracket sells his real estate to a high
bracket individual, the former will have to pay a tax on his
capital gain;2 but this is more than offset by the advantages
arising from the higher depreciation allowances accruing to
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the high tax individual.3 In these circumstances, the tax system
thus gives rise to an incentive to churn assets.
Perhaps the most notorious tax arbitrage activities growing
out of the 1981 Tax Bill were those associated with Safe
Harbor Leasing. Firms that did not have the income against
which to offset their accelerated depreciation allowances and
investment tax credits arranged for other firms with surplus
income in quite different lines of business nominally to
purchase machines for them; they would then lease the
machines back. Thus Chrysler might arrange to have its
machines purchased by, say, Exxon. But it was a pure paper
charade. Chrysler would have purchased the machine by
borrowing, say, 80 percent from a bank, and putting up 20
percent of its own capital. Chrysler might now pay Exxon 20
percent as the first lease payment, and Exxon would borrow
the remaining 80 percent from the same bank. Exxon has done
nothing but sign some papers. In fact, the tremendous tax
advantages which would accrue to Exxon mean that it would
be willing to pay a considerable amount, perhaps enough to
relieve Chrysler of most of its earlier payments.4 Notice that it
is the difference in tax bracket between Chrysler and Exxon
which provides the motivation for these transactions.
These tax arbitrage activities have several consequences.
First, they make it difficult to ascertain the true incidence of
the tax structure who really pays the taxes. Thus, there has
been considerable publicity given to the failure of several of
the major American corporations to pay any taxes in recent
years, largely because of these leasing arrangements. But in
most cases, the companies, like Exxon and GE, who "buy"
the machine and lease it nominally taking the tax advan
tages are not the true beneficiaries: rather it is the companies
in dire straits (Chrysler, for example) to whom more than 85
percent of the benefits accrue. The result is little different from
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what it would be if the government made the investment tax
credit cashable (that is, a company with zero income would
receive a check from the government); or if the government
allowed individuals to defer taking advantage of the tax credit
until the firm had a positive income, but credited the firm with
interest for the deferment (as most economists believe should
be done).
(Similar issues arise in interpreting who gets the benefits
from the provisions of tax exemption of interest on state and
local bonds. A significant fraction of those benefits accrue to
the municipalities, not to the individuals, who earn lower
returns on those bonds than they would on taxable bonds.)
Furthermore, tax arbitrage activities undo some of the
distortions which would otherwise be associated with the tax
system. In the example given above, in the absence of leasing,
the marginal cost of investment for a firm with no income
against which to offset its investment tax credit and its
accelerated depreciation allowances (Chrysler) is greater than
for a company with a high income (Exxon). It is questionable
whether, as a matter of national policy, we would wish to
introduce discriminatory legislation of that form. Leasing
undoes this distortion.
At the same time, tax arbitrage often does lead to distor
tions in economic activities. While pure tax arbitrage has no
effect other than to induce certain paper transactions, that is,
the only dead weight loss is the transaction costs, much of the
activity which I loosely refer to as tax arbitrage is not pure. To
take advantage of the special provisions for capital gains,
individuals may be induced to purchase real estate (because it
is easier to obtain loans against property, and thus take
advantage of the differential treatment between the full deductibility of interest and the 40 percent taxation of long-term
capital gains).5
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Finally, these tax arbitrage activities probably imply that
the true degree of progressivity of the tax system is less than
the nominal degree of progressivity. Wealthier individuals are
in a position to take advantage of these tax avoidance
activities (and have a greater motive to do so). This is, in fact,
one of the reasons for the widespread dissatisfaction with our
current tax system.
The third basic fact concerning the effects of taxation is a
simple and seemingly obvious one, but one which has been
obfuscated in the current debate: it is individuals who bear all
taxes. Corporations may pay taxes, but ultimately, the burden
of all taxation must rest upon individuals the managers or
workers of the corporation, the shareholders, or the custom
ers.
The fourth basic fact concerning the assessment of the
effects of taxation is that the effects of any tax cannot be
assessed in isolation: it is the impact of the whole tax structure
which is relevant. This is true with respect to an evaluation of
both the efficiency and equity consequences. Thus, the mar
ginal tax rate which is relevant for distorting individual
behavior is not just the rate imposed by the federal income
tax, but the total marginal rate, taking into account social
security taxes (and benefits), state income taxes, and sales
taxes.
The final basic fact that is particularly important in assess
ing the consequences of tax changes is that taxes on capital
assets are capitalized; that is, the price of existing assets
reflects future anticipated tax changes. Thus, if there are
particular assets which are taxed at higher (or lower) rates
than other assets, it is not the current owners who bear the
burden of the tax (or receive the benefits), but the owners of
the asset at the time the tax was imposed (or the favorable
treatment granted).6 As a consequence, changes in the tax
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treatment of particular capital assets may have enormous
effects on current owners of assets. Moreover, removing the
favorable treatment accorded some class of assets does not
necessarily remove the inequity created when the favorable
treatment was granted, but may compound the inequities: for
the current owner, who is hurt by the removal of the favorable
treatment, may well not be the same individual who owned it
at the time the favorable treatment was granted. Conversely,
removing the discriminatory treatment on some class of assets
may not provide compensation for those who incurred losses
at the time the discriminatory treatment was imposed.7

Principles of Taxation
In evaluating the desirability of a tax system, economists
have traditionally invoked five principles:
A good tax system should be equitable, first vis-a-vis its
treatment of individuals in roughly similar economic straits
(the principle of horizontal equity)., and second, vis-a-vis its
treatment of individuals in different economic circumstances
(the principle of vertical equity). There is one aspect of these
principles of fairness to which I would like to call attention:
the difficulty of ascertaining what an individual's fair contri
bution is, and of devising ways of implementing whatever
principle one adopts within a legal code. There is a widespread
belief that income is the appropriate basis of taxation, a good
surrogate for ability to pay. Yet virtually all economists and
most noneconomists would agree that income should not be
measured on a daily, or weekly basis. Most economists would
argue that the appropriate time unit is the individual's lifetime
income; that is, the government should not penalize those
individuals whose incomes have fluctuated over their life time,
as our progressive tax structure does. But a lifetime income
tax is, in fact, equivalent to a consumption tax (with appro-
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priate treatment of bequests and inheritances). Thus, if one
believes in a lifetime income tax, one should exempt interest
income, which can be viewed as a discriminatory tax on those
who prefer to consume goods later on in their lives.
Third, a good tax system should "minimize" the distortions
it introduces (the principle of efficiency).
A fourth principle is that a good tax system should not
impose undue administrative costs, either directly, or indirect
ly, on the parties being taxed.
This leads me to the fifth principle of a good tax system, one
about which there is not universal agreement: a good tax
system is one in which individuals know what they are paying.
I sometimes refer to this as the principle of political responsi
bility. Just as we believe it is only fair that lenders tell their
potential borrowers what the interest rate they charge is, and
that manufacturers of food tell their potential customers what
ingredients are contained in the packages they sell, so too it is
only right that the government should tell its citizens what
each, individually, is contributing to the support of public
services. The reason that I say there is not universal agreement
on this principle is that just as lenders often argue that the
truth-in-lending law just confuses potential borrowers, scaring
them off from doing what they intuitively know is in their own
best interests, so, too, some politicians are concerned that
truth-in-government legislation would simply confuse tax
payers and induce them to vote for smaller budgets than they
otherwise would, leading to a cutback in important public
services.
There are, of course, important trade-offs among these
principles. A more progressive ("vertically equitable") tax
system is likely to have a greater dead weight loss.
Some of the distinctions we introduce into our tax system,
e.g., concerning the deductibility of medical expenses are there
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because we believe that they increase the equity of the tax
system; those who have had to pay large medical expenses
have a lower ability to pay than those who have not. But at the
same time, they introduce further inequities. There are two
types of error in any tax system: some individuals (of a given
income) who should have had their taxes reduced (because of
their special circumstances) do not get a tax reduction; and
some individuals who should not have had their taxes reduced
do get a tax reduction. If we tighten rules for medical
deductibility, more individuals who should get a tax reduction
do not; but fewer individuals who should not have gotten a
tax reduction do. There is a trade-off in the two types of error.
There is, moreover, a trade-off between simplicity and
equity. To make fine distinctions (e.g., between those who do
or do not get a medical deduction) requires a complex law; to
simply disallow deductions is simple, but may be unfair.

An Assessment of the Current Reforms
With these principles and facts in mind, let us review the
direction that tax reform appears to be taking in order to
ascertain the extent to which it conforms with these basic
principles.
The major hallmark of the tax reform is the reduction in the
top tax brackets from 50 percent, to 33 percent.8
The tax reform bill has not gone as far in base broadening
as the advocates of reform would have liked. While only
medical expenses in excess of 7.5 percent will be deductible,
the far more important area of employer-provided health
benefits has been left untouched. While state sales taxes will
not be deductible, the more significant state income and local
property taxes remain deductible.
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In retaining the provisions for the deductibility of mortgage
interest, the government probably has undone much of its
effort to reduce the tax deductibility of interest; individuals
will simply substitute home equity loans for car loans as they
were already doing before the new tax law. Again, the
provision will have some impact, for example, on those
individuals who itemize, but do not own a home; how
significant a group this is, and whether this is a particular
group which should be penalized, are questions we should ask
ourselves.
Capital gains will be taxed at full rates. This has one distinct
advantage; it eliminates one of the most important sources of
tax arbitrage. But the raising of the tax rate on capital gains by
more than half, from the current effective maximum rate of 20
percent to 33 percent, may have serious consequences for
economic efficiency. Moreover, most economists would argue
that it is real capital gains, not nominal capital gains, which
should be taxed.
The major effort of the government in simplifying the tax
system has been to replace the system of many tax brackets
with three tax brackets. This, I think, is an inconsequential
simplification. There is little work associated with looking up
one's tax in the tax tables. In other respects, the new tax law
may actually make life more complicated.
One of the more popular proposals for dealing with the
inequities which will remain within our tax system, given the
seeming inability to redesign the tax structure to eliminate the
major "loopholes," is to impose a minimum tax. There is,
again, less to this than meets the eye. As we have noted, many
of the prosperous firms who pay little tax do so because of
leasing provisions. Forcing these firms to pay a minimum tax
will not seriously disadvantage them because most of the
benefits of the leasing provisions accrue to the less well-off
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firms. Thus, the minimum tax may actually work more to the
disadvantage of the less well off, and will increase the distor
tions associated with our tax system.
Most of the currently discussed tax reform proposals entail
shifting the burden of taxation from the individual to the
corporation; this violates the principle of political responsibil
ity. The proponents of this either simply ignore the fact that it
is individuals who must bear the burden of taxation, or are
engaged in a political swindle: precisely because it is not easy
to recognize who bears the burden makes such taxes politi
cally desirable. (There is a third reason for the corporation
tax, to which I shall return later: the belief that it is share
holders and managers who bear the burden, but direct income
taxation is an ineffective way of getting revenue from these
individuals.)
This list of criticisms is not meant to be exhaustive, but
merely to be indicative of the extent to which current propos
als ignore some of the basic principles of taxation.

The Reasons for the Failure of Tax Reform
Indeed, though it may be too soon to make a final
pronouncement, I am willing to venture that at least from
the perspective of most economists the tax bill which finally
emerges from Congress will be a failure; it will fall short of a
major reform dreamed of a little more than two years ago.
What are the reasons for this failure? I want to suggest three
contributing factors.
First, economists have failed to convince the public and
those involved in political decision making of the appropri
ateness of their models. This is partly because some of the
models are, in fact, inappropriate, and it is hard for the
nonspecialist to distinguish among those which are and those
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which are not. This has left the politician in the position of
selectively using economists' arguments: when they wish to
reduce tax rates (to reduce the degree of progressivity), they
refer to supply-side effects and economic efficiency; when they
wish to subsidize smokestack America, they ignore the econ
omists' advice concerning the desirability of investment
neutrality.
Let me give some examples of where the models that are
predominately in use among economists seem, at best, ques
tionable. Perhaps nowhere is there more evidence than in their
analysis of the capital market and corporation taxation. Most
economists' models assume that firms can borrow freely at the
market rate of interest, and this assumption has lead econo
mists to focus on the effect of taxation on the marginal cost of
capital. This effect is undoubtedly important. But many firms
face credit rationing and are unable to raise funds on equity
markets (or it is prohibitively expensive for them to do so).9
They are thus concerned with their after-tax resources, i.e.,
their average rate of taxation.
Equalizing marginal tax rates and equalizing average tax
rates are two quite different matters, when investment patterns
differ. One kind of neutrality does not imply the other kind of
neutrality.
The economists' traditional tirade against IRAs misses the
point that most individuals do not have easy access to
borrowing, and may be induced to increase their savings by
this kind of "gimmick." The evidence to date is mixed:
wealthier individuals are more likely to take advantage of
IRAs, but there is little evidence of the widespread tax
arbitrage that economic theory would predict.
Indeed, even economists have been somewhat schizophrenic
in their analyses of the effects of taxation within their tradi-
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tional neoclassical models. Their models, when strictly ap
plied, simply fail to explain important aspects of individual
and firm behavior. At crucial junctures, they have resorted to
ad hoc assumptions in order to "resolve" what would appear
to be, within the confines of their model, inexplicable paradox
es. Let me mention a few instances. In some earlier work
(Stiglitz 1983, 1985), I took the economists' standard models
of the tax system and of the capital market (perfect capital
markets) and showed that there were tax arbitrage activities
which could completely eliminate all taxes on capital, and
indeed, if carried far enough, all taxes on earned income as
well. I also showed that the optimal behavior of the corpora
tion entailed it never paying dividends (this has come to be
called the dividend paradox); there are tax preferred ways of
distributing funds from the corporate to the unincorporated
sector (Stiglitz 1973). (I also showed that there were no
efficiency losses from the corporation income tax for a firm,
facing no uncertainty provided the firm pursues an optimal
financial policy.) (Stiglitz 1973, 1976.) I do not necessarily
believe the conclusions of these studies; I do not believe that
the corporation tax is nondistortionary. I certainly do not
believe that individuals have eliminated all taxes through tax
arbitrage. But what these models show is how woefully
inadequate the traditional economists' models are for analyz
ing the consequences of taxes. This is not to say that some of
the effects, which they have emphasized are not important.
But I suspect that many politicians, not thoroughly indoctri
nated into the economists' way of thinking, smell, if not a rat,
at least a little mouse; they suspect something is wrong with
the model, but are obviously not in a position to determine
what it is.
Political decision makers may also be somewhat confused
by the seeming vagaries of the profession. A quarter century
ago, economists like Nicky Kaldor and Milton Friedman
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could write, quite convincingly, of the desirability of the
consumption tax based on considerations of economic effi
ciency, because it reduced the number of distortions. Then
economists, following a rediscovery of Frank Ramsey's classic
paper of the late 1920s (Ramsey 1927), realized that two small
distortions might be better than one large distortion (one
could not simply count distortions), and derived conditions
under which an interest income tax would be economically
efficient. But Ramsey had conducted his analysis on the
assumption that there was no progressive income tax. When
this was recognized, the presumption in favor of no interest
income tax was restored. 10
Following this confusion, economists have switched their
arguments for a consumption tax from a focus on economic
efficiency to one on administrative simplicity: much of the
complexity of the tax code, and most of the tax avoidance
activities, are centered around the taxation of capital. (See
Bradford 1986.)
There are further, quite convincing arguments for the
abolition of the taxation of the return to capital. We alluded
to one of these earlier: the belief that the appropriate time
period for taxation is the individual's life time.
Moreover, much of the lost revenue from the abolition of
the taxation of capital is income which, under an ideal tax
system, would not be taxed anyway: nominal (as opposed to
real) returns, including nominal capital gains. With real
interest rates traditionally at less than 1 or 2 percent, the loss
of revenue from the taxation of the real return to capital may
be negligible (although the returns to risk-taking may not be
insignificant).
On the one hand, one might contend that the abolition of
the capital tax hardly constitutes a "solution" to the admin-

22

istrative problem of taxing capital; on the other hand, if the
revenues lost are not too great, if one believes that it is lifetime
income which is the appropriate basis of taxation, and if much
of the complexity and most tax avoidance activity are indeed
associated with capital taxation, elimination of capital taxa
tion becomes an attractive possibility. Yet this is not the route
that the current tax reform has taken, largely because of the
belief, whether mistaken or not, that it would be, or would
appear to be, inequitable.
This brings me to the second explanation for the failure of
tax reform. Our tax system is an important forum within
which our national values become stated. In other words,
what is at issue is more than just economics. We have seen this
repeatedly.
The Jeffersonian ideal of a country of small farmers may be
inappropriate for a modern industrial society, but we still
believe that individuals should have the right to own their own
house, to have an equity claim, so to speak, in America. I am
not unsympathetic with this view, as contrary as it may seem
to economists' traditional obsession with the neutrality be
tween rental and owner-occupied housing. (As an aside,
economists' modelling of the differences between these eco
nomic arrangements leaves much to be desired; the central
issues of moral hazard, the incentive effects of maintenance of
one's own house, are, in this work, completely ignored.)
House ownership has, I suspect, important effects on indivi
duals' views of themselves and their relationship to their
society; and it may have positively beneficial effects on voting
behavior, and hence on the nature of local communities. (See
Stiglitz 1986.)
The positive encouragement of ESOP plans (by which
individuals obtain an equity share in the firms for whom they
work) and IRAs can be justified on similar terms.
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Charity has always played an important role in the Amer
ican ideal and the decentralized provision of public goods
encouraged by the charitable contributions has had, overall, a
tremendously positive influence on our society. Without its
privately supported medical foundations and educational
institutions, America would not be what it is today. Thus it is
not surprising that the charitable deduction has been defended
with such vehemence, and retained.
But once one recognizes the desirability of retaining the
charitable deductions, it is hard to eliminate completely the
deduction for local and state taxes, part of which perform
functions not dissimilar to charity: the compulsory contribu
tion of an elderly individual to support a local public school
system in similar in many ways to his voluntary gift to support
a local private university. 11
The third reason for the failure of tax reform is related to
simple political economy considerations: there are vested
interests who are willing to fight quite hard to retain the
special provisions which benefit them. Some of this may be
put down to simple greed. But I have increasingly become
convinced that there is frequently more to it than that: we live
in a complex world, where the consequences of various
policies are hard to ascertain. Those who are in an industry
know the industry better than anyone else, except perhaps the
economists who have made a study of them; but for reasons I
have already alluded to, the economists' model often appears
to be suspect. Thus, economists might argue that risk markets
work almost perfectly, but the lobbyist for the oil and gas
industry may make a convincing case that this is not true, and
that unless special tax provisions are given, the tax structure
will adversely affect this important industry.
Moreover, as I have also argued, there is more at stake than
just efficiency considerations: there are values. The housing
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industry may concede that mortgage deducibility is not
neutral, but argue that is precisely why it is good.
The problem is to distinguish between legitimate argu
ments, and those that are self-serving.
The political economy problems associated with taxation
should not come as a surprise. Indeed, one can interpret the
restrictions imposed on taxation within the Constitution as a
recognition of them. The writers of the Constitution were well
aware that certain forms of taxation could be used to discrim
inate against different groups, and to favor other groups. The
South, afraid that the more populous North would impose
export taxes, to the South's disadvantage, succeeded in mak
ing such taxes unconstitutional. But they failed to recognize
that in a general equilibrium model, export taxes and import
duties are equivalent, and the North was successful in impos
ing these taxes with differential burdens on the South.
The writers of the Constitution also imposed a uniformity
clause, though the recent decision of the Supreme Court in
upholding the constitutionality of the exemption of North
Slope oil from the windfall profits tax decimated what little
force was left in this important provision.
As most of you may be aware, the Constitution also
originally prohibited direct taxes (such as an income tax) on a
basis other than per head. Whether they intuited the kinds of
problems that we now face may be debated. But certainly the
writers of the amendment allowing the income tax seem, at
least in retrospect, to have been insufficiently aware of the
abuses to which the power to impose that form of taxation is
subject.

Where Do We Go From Here?
What lessons are there to be learned from this failure of tax
reform? Where do we go from here?
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First, it appears to me that we have asked too much of our
tax system. By asking more, we may have gotten less. We have
been overly ambitious in our attempts to redistribute income
through the tax system, and as a result, we have provided
incentives for massive tax avoidance. We have attempted to
address the energy crisis and other social ills with our tax
system; from an administrative perspective, this may not be
unreasonable. It may be cheaper, for example, to subsidize the
rehabilitation of our inner cities through the tax system than
to set up a grants program. But the overall loss in faith in the
equity of our system of financing public services may not be
worth the savings in administrative costs.
Second, I think one can safely conclude that a major
revamping of our income tax system appears unlikely for the
foreseeable future. It should be borne in mind that there are
significant costs associated with continually revising our tax
system; individuals find it difficult to plan for the future, and
this, in itself, may be a discouragement to investment. Given
that a general tax reform appears unlikely, the only way to
reduce the inefficiencies and inequities associated with the tax
system is to reduce the amounts of revenue that we seek to
collect from it. Moreover, reducing the tax rates reduces
incentives to engage in tax avoidance activities. 12
This leads me to a qualified support for the introduction of
a value added (consumption-based) tax. Most economists
have been suspicious of such a tax because it is equivalent to a
proportional income (or consumption) tax (depending on the
specific rules of the tax); thus the introduction of such a tax,
in effect, serves to reduce the overall progressivity to the tax
system. Moreover, it introduces an additional administrative
apparatus. Why, economists have asked, have two adminis
trative systems, when one can do just as well with one?
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What this argument ignores is the fact that there are also
administrative costs associated with tax avoidance activities.
Thus, while it might pay an individual to attempt to avoid a 20
percent income tax, it might not pay him to engage in
activities to avoid a ten percent income tax, and a separate set
of activities to avoid a 10 percent value added tax. Moreover,
the way these taxes are collected, in fact, means that there are
different tax avoidance possibilities in each. Thus, the principle
of multiple nets suggests that one might obtain a more
equitable tax system, with indeed lower overall administrative
costs per dollar raised, by having two separate systems. This
principle of multiple nets can be used to justify two other
aspects of our tax code. If we had a well-functioning estate
and gift tax system, then a consumption tax, combined with
such an estate and gift tax, might well be desirable. But our
gift and estate taxes are far from perfect. We can think of our
present tax system, which exempts much of life cycle savings
(housing, IRAs, pensions, etc.) as an attempt to capture the
returns to some of the capital which escape the estate gift tax
net. The corporation tax may be justified on similar grounds.
I qualify my support for these proposals for a value added
tax for two reasons. First, there will be pressures to have a
nonuniform value added tax. The more differentiated the tax,
the greater the administrative problems, and the more likely
we are to wind up in the same quagmire that we now find
ourselves in with respect to the income tax. Second, there is
concern that political leaders will take advantage of consumer
ignorance, of their inability to ascertain their true tax liabili
ties, and that the imposition of the value added tax will
provide a mechanism for an expansion of the scale of the
public sector.
The growing recognition of what I call the "political
economy problems," what the popular press refers to as the
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lack of restraint on government expenditures and govern
ment's propensity to dispense favors to special interest groups,
and what economists might loosely describe as the lack of
optimality of political equilibrium 13 (see Atkinson and Stiglitz
1980 or Stiglitz 1986), has given rise to a movement for
constitutional restrictions on the level of government expen
ditures and the size of the deficit.
Note that the change in the constitutional restrictions on
the set of admissible taxes may be closely tied to concerns
about the size of the public sector. Popular support for
government expenditure programs may be much greater if one
believes that someone else (or no one) pays for it. With a
progressive income tax, or a corporation tax, one can be
mislead into believing that it is the "rich" or "corporations"
which pay. Many of our current programs might not be
supported if we had to finance them out of a head tax. 14
That is one of the reasons I have emphasized earlier the
importance of the principle of political responsibility in tax
systems.
I have mixed feelings about these proposals for a constitu
tional amendment. The dangers of the loss of flexibility from
a constitutional amendment must be balanced against the
possible advantages in ameliorating the problems with which
we have been concerned here. Moreover, I am not convinced
that the proposals I have seen will deal adequately with the
problem. Restrictions in deficits, in the absences of an ade
quate capital budget, give rise to incentives to sell government
assets such as the sale of offshore oil and gas leases during the
past few years merely to balance the books, regardless of
long-term costs to the American taxpayer. Restrictions on
government expenditures give rise to the use of tax expendi
tures, loan guarantees, and other devices, regardless of their
merits relative to direct expenditures. Nor do the standard
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proposals do anything to address directly the abuses of our
tax system, i.e., the structure problems which are the center of
concern of the tax reform movement.
There are no easy solutions. As an educator, I have a
strong belief in the value of information. That is why I think
it important to have some truth-in-government legislation,
where the government details the tax burden imposed on each
individual. 15 I also think this kind of forum you have been
holding here this year on taxation, the objective of which is to
increase the general understanding of the effects of our tax
system, is vital. I am pleased and honored to have been invited
to address you this evening, and to participate with you in
these endeavors.
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NOTES
1. The marginal tax rate determines the magnitude of the substitution effect
(at a given level of welfare, which is related to how the individual trades off
consumption and leisure, or present consumption and future consump
tion), the average tax rate determines the magnitude of the income effect.
The total effect is the sum of the two. The inefficiency associated with the
tax system is associated with the substitution effect. The absence of a
significant total effect (with substitution and income effects offsetting each
other) has often been confused with the absence of any distortionary effect.
2. And there may possibly be a tax at ordinary rates on the recapture of his
depreciation.
3. Even taking into account recapture. See Stiglitz (1985).
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4. This description oversimplifies by ignoring the important risks which
Exxon might face in the presence of a default on the part of Chrysler. One
of the main consequences of the Safe Harbor Provisions were to reduce
those risks.
5. In addition, the "at risk" provisions are more favorable in real estate.
6. Or more accurately, at the time that it became believed that such a tax
would be imposed (or such a favorable treatment would be granted).
7. Or more accurately, at the time that it became believed that such a tax
would be imposed (or such a favorable treatment would be granted).
8. The legislated top rate is 28 percent, but as individuals' incomes
increase, there is a reduction in their exemptions (and standard deductions)
so that the effective rate is 33 percent.
9. There are good reasons for this, based on theories of imperfect
information. See Stiglitz and Weiss (1981, 1983) and Greenwald, Stiglitz,
and Weiss (1984).
10. See Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976). More accurately, there are conditions
under which there should be an interest income tax, and other conditions
under which there should be an interest income subsidy. It appears difficult
to ascertain empirically which of these conditions actually prevail.
11. The minimum tax may similarly be viewed as desirable, not because it
actually increases equity, or because it increases efficiency, but because it
represents a statement of values, that is, the principle that every one above
a certain income level should pay at least 20 percent of his income to the
government, and it should be transparent that he does so.
12. Though much of the cost of those activities may be the fixed costs
associated with learning about how to avoid taxes. If that is the case, then a
reduction in tax rates may not reduce tax avoidance activities substantially.
13. Or, indeed, the absence of an equilibrium (see Arrow 1951).
14. Similarly, the scope for redistribution at the local and state level is
much different than at the national level. The extent of distribution which
well emerges if responsibility for welfare is placed at the state and local
level differs from that which will emerge if the locus of responsibility is at
the national level.
15. There are obvious difficulties, because not even economists can agree
on who pays the corporation tax. But these ambiguities can be noted in the
"information" sheet sent to each individual.
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Rating Tax Reform
on Growth
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Let me begin this lecture with a hypothetical question:
suppose that you were confronted with two alternative lottery
tickets, one with relatively attractive odds of a small prize and
the other with longer odds but a larger prize.
How would you evaluate the alternatives? What would
influence you in making your choice?
Would you place a bet only if your preferred alternative
were made available, or would you take a chance either way?
I raise these questions because they are much like the
choices among alternative investments that many businesses
must make. Further, the tax system can make business choices
more like either the high-percentage, low-stakes bet or the
low-percentage, high-stakes bet.
Of course, the most fundamental elements of the tax system
are very much on the bargaining table right now, in a process
that has come to be known as tax reform. This process is
highly controversial, with conflicting claims of paradise and
inferno as the likely result. Nowhere have the claims and
counterclaims been more frequent and more strident than in
the field of business taxation. Some business spokesmen have
seen tax reform as a step toward a more efficient and neutral
allocation of investment capital among sectors, leading to
faster growth and greater productivity. Advocates of other
firms, however, have been particularly adamant that tax
reform will choke off investment and lead to stagnation.
Which side is right? Is either side right?
31
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Even in this environment of uncertainty, we can say some
things about what a sound tax policy would be, guided by
basic principles and by recent economic history. The stakes
are high, and so this inquiry is well worth the effort.
I will begin this lecture by setting the scene for the tax
reform debate with the tax cuts of 1981. We will see that this
law's attempts to stimulate growth caused much of the
impetus for tax reform today. We will also see how today's
proposals for reform of the individual income tax largely
determine the outlines of proposals for business tax reform,
and that these outlines lead to much of the opposition on
grounds of investment and growth. Finally, we will examine
the track record of the current law on investment, and
consider the prospects for investment under distinctly dif
ferent tax rules.

Tax Reform Yesterday
Several years ago, an imaginative pundit wrote a mostly
(but not totally) tongue-in-cheek piece called "The Ten Com
mandments of Tax Reform." Commandment number one (as
I recall) was a dictum apparently well known to policymakers,
instinctively if not consciously: "Whatever you want to do,
call it'reform.'"*
On this basis, it is not surprising that we have had a lot of
tax "reform" in recent years.
It is not a huge logical leap from the nearly universal cries
that our tax system today is in desperate need of "reform" to
*(I confess that, with the best of intentions and calling upon the most knowledgeable people
in the field, I cannot document this article that is so vividly etched upon my memory. Perhaps
someone who hears or reads this lecture will be able to help me along. Or in the best of all
possible outcomes, perhaps I only imagined it. Then I would have only nine commandments
to go, and I could write the article myself)
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a realization that the many recent "reforms" somehow missed
their mark. The proof of this idea is no farther away than the
last major piece of tax "reform" legislation, and indeed the
root of our current budgetary crisis: the Economic Recovery
Tax Act of 1981, commonly identified by its acronym of
ERTA.
ERTA was motivated, for the most part, by two strongly
held beliefs of its early champions: that the level of individual
marginal income tax rates was so high as to deter work and
saving; and that the tax treatment of business investments in
depreciable capital, the carriers of technological progress and
the instruments of growth, was so rigorous as to choke off
such investments. Obviously, with an agenda such as that, tax
reform was quite simple; cutting individual income tax rates is
intellectually trivial, and accelerating business growth can be
(and was) done in simple ways.
Of course, the political salvation of ERTA was that it did
not hurt anyone (with very few exceptions, to be discussed
later). ERTA was the tax equivalent of throwing money at
problems roughly $747 billion over five years, to be specific.
Roughly two-thirds of this tax cut went to individuals, and
about one-third to corporations. With an uplifting theme like
"reform," and all that money to go around, who could be
opposed?
The problem, as we now see so clearly, is that ERTA both
gave away money that we as a nation did not have, and that
it did so in an inconsistent manner. On the question of raw
dollars, ERTA opened a budget chasm that was to be filled
with future unspecified budget cuts. The nation took the cash
with a smile, and only recoiled when the spending-cut bills
came due. Without the spending cuts that a now-informed
nation refuses to make, the tax cuts are unjustifiable.
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Equally troublesome for tax policy, however, are the inter
nal inconsistencies that ERTA created. Though allegedly
evenhanded because of equal percentage tax rate cuts across
the board, ERTA in fact shortchanged the poor and nearpoor. The percentage tax rate cut did little for millions of
low-income persons whose personal exemptions and zero
bracket amounts, badly eroded by five years of rapid inflation,
were left to continue to erode over five more years.
A further and more structural inconsistency of the post1981 tax law was demonstrated by the enactment and heavy
use of safe-harbor tax leasing. ERTA, in its zeal to encourage
business investment in depreciable capital, including the Ac
celerated Cost Recovery System (ACRS). ACRS made tax
depreciation extraordinarily generous so generous, in fact,
that many firms found that the early-year deductions, in
combination with the investment tax credit (ITC), completely
wiped out their tax liabilities, with still more deductions left
over. These deductions were temporarily wasted unless the
investing firm had income from other sources against which
the deductions could be offset. This gave an important
advantage to large, highly profitable firms, who could use all
of the their tax advantages from depreciation; smaller firms,
especially new firms with little or no taxable income, would
have to raise more cash to undertake investments (because
they could not enjoy an immediate tax reduction from depre
ciation and the ITC), and so such firms might choose to
postpone investments until they could use the tax breaks.
The Reagan administration foresaw this problem, and
chose to remedy it by allowing safe-harbor leases paper
transactions through which firms that could not use their full
depreciation deductions and ITCs could sell their assets to
more profitable firms that could use the tax benefits. The
public outcry that followed the "buying and selling of tax
breaks," however, with the spectacle of banks, insurance
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companies, and General Electric claiming deductions and
credits for other firms' investments and paying no income tax
on billions of dollars of profits, caused the Congress to
promptly reverse its field and repeal the leasing law. Congress
did not, of course, repeal the ACRS and ITC provisions that
motivated safe-harbor leasing; so while the symptom has been
cured, the disease remains. New symptoms have appeared,
including mergers involving firms with unused reservoirs of
tax deductions and credits.
Both the internal inconsistencies and the revenue inadequa
cies of the post-1981 tax law have motivated the current drive
for tax reform. The role of the internal inconsistencies is
obvious; the President and all other tax reform advocates cite
the need for tax relief for the poor and an end to overgenerous depreciation. (In the case of the President, of course,
this is quite an about-face from four years ago.) The revenue
motivation for tax reform is perhaps less obvious, however;
the President insists that any tax reform be revenue neutral,
and all other reform proposals claim to follow that line
(though some fall short). Nonetheless, many advocates of
these proposals acknowledge that a tax increase to narrow the
deficit is inevitable. The motivation for reform is that the
current tax law, laden as it is with internal inconsistencies,
could not provide substantial additional revenues without
harmful side effects. If the President stands in the way of a tax
increase but would welcome tax reform, it would be wise to
get the first half of the job out of the way. Then when the need
for revenue becomes even more apparent, possibly in a crisis,
the necessary revenue tool will be ready.

Tax Reform Today
The new tax reform proposals are different from the 1981
model in that they cannot give any money away. They are
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further different in that they address the issue that was the
heart of the tax reform debate for decades before the 1981
distraction: the definition of the tax base. In response to
complaints from the household sector that the income tax is
unfair, the President and others propose to repeal numerous
deductions, exclusions, and credits from the tax law, reducing
tax rates in compensation. Of course, with no money to give
away and major changes in the law, it follows immediately
that some taxpayers will win in the process, but others will
lose. Nevertheless, by transferring revenues from the corpo
rate sector to finance a household sector tax cut, the President
can promise most households tax relief when the dust finally
settles.
This kind of tax reform is acceptable to just about everyone
(except those who lose deductions, exclusions, or credits that
are particularly close to their hearts and wallets). In fact, tax
reform is remarkable in uniting the tax field's "old fogies" and
the "young turks." Old line tax reformers, of course, would
like nothing more than a broader individual income tax base
with lower rates. And even the supply-siders, if they really
mean what they say about the primary importance of reducing
marginal tax rates, have to agree with the wisdom of such tax
reform. For them, a tax cut in dollar terms is not a necessary
condition for supply-side economics to work. (In fact, from a
more conventional point of view, supply-side economics could
be successful if the tax base were broadened to recoup the
revenue loss, and so no money were given away. In that case,
the lower tax rates could encourage more work and saving,
without a cash windfall to encourage leisure and spending.) So
individual income tax reform a la Reagan 1985 has become
part of the conventional wisdom of economic policymaking,
even if it is not every interest group's cup of tea.
Business tax reform proposals follow right along with the
individual version. Many of the individual income tax prefer-
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ences that cause the most unfairness and manipulative tax
sheltering ACRS, the ITC, accelerated and exaggerated
writeoffs for oil and gas drilling, accounting abuses also are
used in the corporate sector. If they are repealed for house
holds, then they must be repealed for corporations too. Just as
marginal tax rates are reduced for households in compensa
tion for the revenue gains from base broadening, so they are
reduced for corporations. After all, the corporate income tax
is really just a proxy tax on income that is temporarily held
outside of the household sector; we tax corporations because,
if we did not, households could set up corporations to hold
and invest their money and therefore act as tax shelters. The
reduction of corporate marginal tax rates keeps the top
corporate rate roughly in line with the top individual rate, so
that the proxy tax does not encourage the organization of
businesses in either incorporated or unincorporated forms.
Thus, the conventional wisdom on individual income tax
reform dictates the nature of tax reform on the corporate side;
and because it is both conventional and wisdom, with agree
ment from many ideological adversaries, everything must be
hunky dory.
Mustn't it?
Lately there have been two distinct challenges to the
corporate branch of tax reform as now preached and prac
ticed. One challenge comes from within the traditional tax
reform ranks and some other mainstream economists. This
group argues that low-rate, low-subsidy corporate tax reform
fails to make a proper distinction between old and new
investments in plant and equipment. The argument goes like
this: Corporations invested in depreciable capital in the past
assuming that they would pay tax on any net income at 46
percent (the highest corporate rate, at which most corporate
income is taxed). Under tax reform, however, that tax rate

38

would be cut to anywhere from 30 to 35 percent. That tax cut,
the argument goes, is a pure windfall for investment that is
already made, so that much of the revenue lost through the
rate cut is wasted. The merit of the investment tax credit and
accelerated depreciation, the story continues, is that they
benefit only new investment. The high corporate tax rate that
goes along with these subsidies (of necessity, to make up the
revenues loss) then soaks up much of any abnormally high
profits (or "rents") of old investments, without discouraging
new investment. So this challenge is based on arguments of
both economic and cost efficiency. (This argument underlies
the Reagan administration's proposed "windfall recapture
tax" on the benefits of past accelerated depreciation.) An
extension of this argument is that a high corporate tax rate,
falling as it most likely does on owners of capital, helps to
make the overall tax system more progressive.
The other challenge comes not so much from economists as
from the business sector. Some (but by no means all) business
leaders argue that any diminution of incentives to invest,
either through increases in the corporate tax burden (which
the Reagan administration proposes to fund individual in
come tax cuts) or through cutbacks of targeted investment
subsidies, pushes in the wrong direction. The nation needs
more investment, this argument goes, because a shortage of
investment has been the culprit in our recent economic
sluggishness. More investment would increase productivity,
because investment is what brings the latest technology into
the production process. From this point of view, tax reform's
emphasis on the efficient allocation of investment, rather than
on the raw amount of investment, is misplaced; we could end
up with a better allocation of less capital, and be worse off
when the dust settles.
Of course, this business argument is far from universally
held; and keeping in mind business' tendency to look at the
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bottom line, this is not surprising. Remember that under a
revenue-neutral business tax reform, some corporations
would pay less tax, and some corporations would pay more.
Because every business executive probably has a very keen
sense of his firm's contribution to society, those executives
whose firms would lose cash flow naturally have had negative
things to say. Likewise, of course, leaders of firms that would
win from tax reform (including primarily those firms most
heavily taxed under the current law) have come forward
aggressively to favor reform. This is another respect in which
1985 differs most vividly from 1981; four years ago, businesses
marched in lockstep for the huge tax cut represented by
ACRS; today, because there would be losers as well as
winners, the ranks are highly fractionated.
Consequently, economists and business leaders are divided
on business tax reform, with the ultimate emphasis on growth.
Some policy analysts and businessmen say that tax reform
would make our nation leaner and tougher; others counter
that business would be smaller and weaker. In the corporate
sector, this division is easily explained by self-interest; but
similar disagreements among economists prevent us from
assuming that the only issue is whose oxen are gored. If we
want to make the best possible judgment, we must go beyond
the politics of the issue and analyze the economics.

Taking Stock
So what are the merits of these arguments? Will tax reform
encourage or inhibit growth? To approach an answer, we
must use economic theory, our recent experience, and (be
cause we are contemplating new policy tools) some new
thinking. We should certainly start by examining the link
between tax policy and investment, but before we finish, we
must also reconsider the often-assumed link between invest
ment and growth.
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Theory. Unfortunately, as even the most avid theorists and
econometricians would admit, our understanding of what
causes investment is fuzzy at best. Two theories probably hold
the most currency: the cost of capital theory and the acceler
ator theory.
The cost of capital theory relies on neoclassical economics,
putting a heavy emphasis on the supplies of factors of
production, and less on the levels of aggregate demand needed
to assure that those factors of production are fully employed.
The cost of capital model focuses on how much it costs in
interest, depreciation, and taxes, among other expenses to
use a given quantity of capital for a given length of time.
Because an equity investor in a unit of capital will want some
positive return to justify his investment, there will most likely
be some tax liability as part of the cost of capital. This tax
liability increases the before-tax return needed to provide the
investor with the minimum acceptable after-tax return (the
least return that would induce the investor to make the
investment). Thus, an increase in taxes on investment would
make some previously acceptable investments unacceptable; it
would raise the cost of capital for the marginal investment.
The accelerator theory, in contrast, looks more closely at
the state of aggregate demand, and less closely at the supply of
factors of production. It holds that investment is induced by
increases in consumer demand which push on productive
capacity, rather than by tax cuts for investment per se. From
the point of view of the accelerator theory, a tax cut for
investment income while businesses by and large have excess
capacity would be wasted; it would be "pushing on a string,"
to invoke a common analogy. The revenue loss would go
largely to businesses that would be investing anyway.
As was suggested not too long ago, neither of these two
theories can claim an extreme of predictive accuracy. Empir-
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ical studies suggest that business behavior depends on many
factors, surely including businessmen's varying perceptions of
the conditions in their own varied markets. This diversity of
view surely has much to do with the failure of any theoretical
model to explain actual behavior.
Of the two models, though, it is the cost of capital model
that is the more pertinent to the criticisms of tax reform
related above. Economists would argue that incentives should
be targeted to new investments, and businessmen would
emphasize the level of business taxes, whether through incen
tives or not. The kind of demand-push fiscal stimulus envi
sioned in the accelerator model seems to be out of the question
at the moment; our demand seems to have been pushed about
as far as it would go in 1981.
The Record. It is here that recent history can lend a hand.
Surely the 1981 tax law was the quintessential reduction in the
tax component of the cost of capital; it cut business taxes
significantly through a substantial acceleration of deprecia
tion, targeted on new investment. In fact, its reduction in the
tax component of the cost of capital was so great that in many
instances, it made that tax component negative. That is, it
gave such accelerated deductions for depreciation, coupled
with the pre-existing investment tax credit, that the tax
deductions and credits wiped out the tax liability of the typical
investment in its early years, with more tax benefits left over.
If the investor had income from other sources against which
he could claim the deductions and credits, those tax savings
exceeded (in present value terms) the tax on the investment in
question in its later years, after the deductions and credits
were used up. Taking into account the tax savings on other
income and the time value of money, ACRS and the ITC were
so generous as to make many typical investments into tax
shelters. If that wouldn't stimulate investment, what would?
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But did it stimulate investment? Here opinions differ. Some
business advocates argue that the recovery of investment from
the 1981-82 recession has been remarkable, and they seem to
have the numbers on their side. Business investments in
nonresidential structures and in equipment have grown more
rapidly after this recession than they have in the typical
previous post-World War II recovery. Advocates of generous
tax treatment of investment assign this growth to the 1981 tax
cuts.
A critical look at the numbers, however, leads to a far
different outcome. The most important issue is just where this
apparent boom in investment has gone. Barry Bosworth has
shown that the increase in investment in equipment is highly
concentrated in two types of assets: computers and business
automobiles. It happens that the one area where ACRS was
not generous was in its treatment of computers, which in fact
fell between the cracks and were made subject to longer, not
shorter, depreciable lives. The stimulus to investment in
computers seems to have come from another direction: their
falling prices. This episode just serves as a reminder that tax
policy is by no means all of economics, and should not be the
first resort for action on any problem that happens along. The
boom in investment in business automobiles has an equally
ideosyncratic explanation; consumers have become more in
terested in automobile leasing as an alternative to purchase,
and a leased automobile, even if used purely for personal
purposes, is considered an investment by the leasing firm
hence the jump in the investment figures.
When he omits computers and business automobiles from
the investment statistics, Bosworth finds that the investment
recovery from the 1981-82 recession looks much more typical
from an historical perspective. In fact, when he measures the
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investment recovery relative to the previous business cycle
peak, rather than the low point of the recession (which in
1981-82 was extraordinarily low), Bosworth finds that the
investment recovery has been below average (Barry P. Bosworth, "Taxes and the Investment Recovery," Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity 1:1985, pp. 1-38).
A further qualification of the strength of the investment
recovery comes from an examination of investment in types of
structures. Investment in industrial structures factories has
been virtually flat since 1980. The growth of investment in
nonresidential structures has been confined to commercial
structures such as shopping centers and office buildings.
Most analysts, certainly including many business advocates,
would admit that investment in commercial structures was not
a goal of the 1981 tax law, and has little potential impact on
U.S. growth and competitiveness.
It is my conclusion from the data as described above that
the extreme attempt at investment stimulus through tax policy
undertaken in 1981 has failed, thus far, to produce demon
strable results. This is especially true in light of the reinforcing
of the "cost of capital" tax cut strategy with an "accelerator"
tax cut promising a rush of consumer demand and encourag
ing firms to build up their productive capacity.
There is certainly an argument that insufficient time has
passed to pronounce judgment on the 1981 tax law, and that
circumstances since 1981 have been extraordinary and have
not allowed a fair test. One point worth considering, however
is that the 1981 tax cuts may well have helped to create those
extraordinary circumstances. Massive tax cuts, even on the
order of ACRS taken alone, will increase the federal govern
ment deficit and drive up interest rates. This is especially true
because tax inducements to investment invariably are enjoyed
by those who would have invested without the incentives, as

44

well as the few who are affected at the margin. If the monetary
authorities should fear an inflationary burst of excess demand
and restrain the growth of the money supply, that will increase
interest rates further. Because interest expense is an element of
the cost of capital again, investment is determined by more
than taxes alone an extreme strategy of investment subsidy
through tax cuts can boomerang.
While we do not now have ironclad proof, the track record
of tax subsidies for investment appears less than promising. In
my judgment, we might well regard advocates of further
investment subsidies in the tax code as 19th century physicians
leaving a comatose patient to get more leeches.

The Issues
Why have tax incentives for investment had so little effect?
In my opinion, despite its logical underpinnings, the cost-ofcapital theory has some significant weaknesses as a guide to
policy, especially when taken to extremes. I would like to
discuss four areas in which I believe this is true.
New, Risky, and Recent-Loss Firms. To encourage invest
ment under the cost-of-capital approach, taxes must be cut on
the marginal investment. Significant tax cuts on investments
earning only a minimum acceptable rate of return can take on
strange forms, however. To stimulate investment in this way,
ERTA resorted to such enormous accelerations of deprecia
tion allowances that the tax on many marginal investments
became negative. As was explained earlier, investors receive
more deductions and credits than they need to wipe out all tax
on the income generated by an investment early in its life. The
excess deductions and credits can be used to offset tax on the
investor's other income.
A problem arises if the investor does not have any other
taxable income. In that case, the excess deductions just sit on
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the firm's accountant's shelf, depreciating with the passage of
inflation. A firm in this situation has to raise more money in
the credit markets to undertake an additional investment,
because it does not have any reserves against taxes to draw
down in anticipation of the value of the resulting tax prefer
ences. Such a firm may postpone investments until a later
date, when it expects to become profitable; or it may become
prey for a takeover by some other firm that does have taxable
income. (As was noted earlier, the 1981 tax law included
safe-harbor leasing as a safety valve for just such situations,
but the public found the results of tax leasing too offensive.)
These problems befall particular kinds of firms: new firms,
which typically make large start-up investments and do not
earn profits for several years; firms that have recently been
unprofitable and are attempting to turn their situations
around; and technologically advanced (colloquially, "high
tech") firms, which make large investments with long gesta
tion periods and uncertain chances of success. For these firms
and for any others that cannot use their investment subsidies
immediately, the tax benefits are significantly less valuable;
consequently, some portion of the business population is left
out of the investment subsidy strategy and disadvantaged by
it. This could well make our investment performance under a
cost of capital strategy less favorable than we might expect.
Furthermore, it is far from clear that it is in our economic
interest to favor large, established firms in traditional lines of
business.
Tax Shelters. As was noted earlier, even a traditional
investment can receive a negative effective tax rate under
ACRS. It should not be surprising, then, that tax shelter
brokers can achieve new heights of manipulation under the
current law. In 1981, for the first time in a quarter century of
compiled statistics, the entire partnership sector of the econ-
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omy (partnerships are the preferred vehicles for tax shelters)
showed an aggregate net loss, so great was the boom in tax
sheltering. In 1982, this dubious distinction was repeated. The
availability of ACRS depreciation deductions effective Janu
ary 1, 1981, was an important cause of this development. Tax
shelters cost the federal government revenue, and they waste
capital as well; without the benefits of tax sheltering, there is
no doubt that less of the U.S. capital stock would be allocated
into investments in the oil and gas industry, and in residential
and commercial real estate.
The use of real estate as a tax shelter causes another serious
problem of resource misallocation. Commercial and residen
tial real estate makes an effective tax shelter because it is easily
resaleable (apartment and office buildings make safe and
liquid investments because they almost always have many
alternative users), and so it can be highly leveraged. That way,
small amounts of cash can generate large amounts of depre
ciation deductions. In contrast, factories have fewer alterna
tive users, and so they are riskier investments, and less
amenable to debt finance. If commercial and industrial struc
tures received depreciation treatment equally generous to that
of equipment, this tax sheltering would get completely out of
hand. To prevent this, depreciation for shelters is made less
generous than that for equipment (measured by the actual
reduction in value, i.e., economic depreciation, over time). But
this less generous depreciation treatment of structures carries
over to disadvantage investments in factories, as opposed to
shopping centers and office buildings. The tax bias away from
industrial structures can only hinder growth over the long run
by encouraging investments in modern equipment to be
placed in outmoded structures. It is an inevitable outgrowth of
an unbalanced policy with extreme incentives for investments
in equipment.
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Double Taxation of Corporate Income. Another aspect of
the investment incentive strategy is its effect on the double
taxation of corporate source income. As was noted earlier, the
rich investment incentives in the current law cost revenue, and
so for any given revenue target, statutory tax rates must be
higher. (Because the same generous depreciation must be
made available to individual as to corporate investors, this
strategy increases individual tax rates as well as corporate tax
rates.) These higher tax rates increase the double tax on corpo
rate source income at the margin, that is, on an additional dollar
of fully taxable corporate income that is then distributed.
Sensitivity to Inflation. Another source of distortions be
cause of the high tax rates required to finance large investment
incentives is the interaction of the income tax and inflation.
With higher tax rates, the mismeasurement of income and of
interest expense due to inflation is more serious. (Further,
ACRS itself is highly sensitive to inflation; at the low inflation
rates that we currently enjoy, ACRS is an even greater net
subsidy to investment than was anticipated at its enactment
during the high inflation of 1981.)
Summary. A frequently heard argument for investment
subsidies is that they encourage risk taking and innovation. As
the foregoing analysis suggests, however, this is true in only a
limited sense. Rich tax subsidies like ACRS encourage a risk
taking and innovation, but mostly by large, established firms;
newcomers and revitalized firms get less of a tax advantage.
Further, if the incentive to innovate is a function of the
after-tax income that the innovation will yield, and if the tax
rate is close to 50 percent for either an individual or a
corporation, that incentive has to be blunted. A firm or an
individual with a new idea has to think twice about the
relationship of after-tax reward to risk. What our current tax
code seems to foster more than anything, in fact, is ultra-safe
investments like real estate.
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It was with this tenor of the current tax code in mind that
I raised my opening question about a low-risk, low-return
lottery compared to a high-risk, high-return one. The current
tax law, for all its stated intentions about innovation, seems
more directed toward stand-pat investments. Business lobby
ists may well argue that the world will end if our rich
investment incentives are cut back or repealed. We should not
be surprised by this; after all, that is what business lobbyists
are (well) paid to do. Business executives, if they do what they
are (well) paid to do, will seek out investments where there is
profit to be made; and that task will not be changed by the
repeal of tax subsidies for investment.
We can only wonder how our economy would perform if
the tax code were purged of opportunities for low-risk,
tax-shelter arbitrage, and were left with only a substantial
reward for truly productive activity. There are some thoughts,
however, that might give some idea of the potential benefits of
tax reform.

Tax Reform Tomorrow
There is reason to believe that many of the allegations of tax
reform harming investment are either unimportant or inaccu
rate. There are other reasons why tax reform could in fact
create a better climate for investment than many observers
would anticipate. And there is further reason to expect that in
tax reform as currently contemplated, getting there will be half
the fun.
Investment and Growth. One possible criticism of tax reform
from the cost-of-capital view of the world would be the likely
increase in the tax burden on the marginal investment. With
ACRS extending negative tax rates to many investments,
there is no question that the current law reduces the required
rate of return for investment. Tax reform, by repealing these
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net subsidies, would raise the required rate of return. Is this a
serious disadvantage of tax reform? What would its effect be?
From a real world perspective, it is difficult to evaluate just
how important it is to drive down the required rate of return
to the extent that ACRS does. There is no telling just how
often a firm contemplates an investment that it truly believes
to be marginal. Some investments wind up earning barely a
required rate of return; indeed, some wind up earning only
losses. But it is unlikely that those investments were under
taken in anticipation of performing unsatisfactorily, or even
marginally.
Further, and more important, the connection between
investment and growth is almost certainly exaggerated by
many casual commentators; in particular, the value of stretch
ing investment a margin further in a given year is easily
overstated. If markets work (and if they do not, I am unsure
why you invited an economist to speak to you this evening),
then the best investments, the ones that make the greatest
contributions to productivity and growth, are the ones that
will pass any reasonable market test. The investments that
could then be teased out of the economy at the margin are the
ones whose value is, well, marginal. As I argued earlier, a
good deal of the additional investment stimulated by ACRS
was apparently in tax shelters. This suggests that we must
examine critically those casual notions about investment being
the engine of all progress and growth, and the risks that tax
reform, being less generous at the margin, will somehow
reduce our well being.
Benefits of Tax Reform. Criticisms of tax reform on the
basis of its impact on the tax component of a cost of capital
formula ignore its other potentially beneficial effects.
As was noted above, the likely outcome of a low-rate
income tax with neutral, nonsubsidized depreciation is a
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reduction of tax sheltering. This welcome development would
redirect billions of dollars from socially unproductive invest
ments in real estate and other tax-favored areas into more
traditional investment fields. The additional capital would
offset the effect of the elimination of investment subsidies.
Likewise, a reduction in marginal tax rates for individuals
has the potential to encourage saving. In all likelihood, the
increase in saving would be modest, but it would be welcome;
and it would make more funds available for traditional
investments. Perhaps even more significant, reduced tax rates
and cutbacks of deductibility of interest on consumer loans
(including increases in the zero bracket amount, which reduce
the number of people who itemize) will decrease borrowing,
which is negative saving.
The importance of these developments should not be
ignored. Many business advocates seem to take a tunnel view
of tax reform and investment, seeing only the repeal of the
investment credit or of ACRS. What such observers fail to see
is favorable movements of another element of the cost of
capital: interest expense. If capital moves from tax shelters
into traditional investments, and household saving and bor
rowing shift modestly but favorably, tax changes in the cost of
capital could be offset by reduced borrowing costs, leaving the
business sector better off.
Another beneficial effect of tax reform and lower marginal
tax rates will be a greater incentive to work. Again, changes
will likely be modest, but favorable. When all of these changes
occur simultaneously, and all are movements in the right
direction, there is at least the potential for a favorable
synergism where the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.
The Joy of Transition. In most changes of tax laws, the
transition phase is a source of pain and complexity. In many
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respects, a major tax reform may be no different. But in terms
of the incentive to invest, the transition may be a major plus.
President Reagan has proposed a tax cut for individuals to
be financed by a tax increase on corporations. Many of the
revenue-raising steps under the corporate tax, by their nature,
grow into their full effect over several years. This is generally
true of changes in depreciation, which affect only investments
made after the passage of the law, and so embrace the entire
capital stock only as the pre-existing capital stock wears out
over a period of years. (This revenue pattern would not hold
under the administration's current depreciation proposal
which, through newfound generosity, in fact loses revenue in
the long run. This is a source of concern regarding the
administration's plan.)
Because the revenue gain tends to be less in the early years,
revenue neutrality requires that certain steps be taken to raise
revenue in the first years after enactment. One such proposal
was the administration's windfall recapture tax, which would
add into taxable income a fraction of accelerated depreciation
allowances claimed since 1980, and would raise revenue for
only four years. As was explained above, this provision is
intended to recover some of the windfall gain to corporations
who invested in anticipation of paying tax at a 46 percent rate,
only to be greeted by a tax reform that would impose tax at
only 33 percent. Whatever its merits, the windfall recapture
tax has met with extreme hostility, largely on grounds of being
a retroactive burden. Its chances of enactment are considered
to be slim.
The obvious alternative to the recapture tax as a purely
temporary revenue raiser is a phasing in of the corporate tax
rate reduction. While politically only a second choice to the
current administration, the corporate rate cut phase-in is an
economic gold mine. Consider these attributes:
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First, the rate cut phase-in acts as a short-run investment
incentive. A firm that invests early on can claim its deprecia
tion deductions against a higher tax rate, making them more
valuable.
And second, the phase-in concentrates the benefits of the
ultimate rate reduction on new rather than old capital. In the
first years of the phase-in, pre-existing capital is subject to a
relatively high rate of tax, reducing the windfall for which
some economists criticize tax reform. As the pre-existing
capital wears out, however, the statutory tax rates are re
duced, giving the relief to a greater extent to capital purchased
after the tax reform takes effect. In the long run, the rate
reduction rains down more than it otherwise would on new
capital, making tax reform more cost effective in terms of
stimulating new investment.
Thus, a temporary provision needed to make tax reform
revenue-neutral over the short run could defuse much of the
criticism of the entire grand undertaking on grounds of its
effect on investment.
Summary. Several aspects of tax reform have the potential
to improve significantly the economic climate in general, and
that for investment in particular. Observers who view tax
reform from one particular perspective have a tendency to
miss this big picture. We should keep the broad view in mind
when we make our decisions on tax reform.

Conclusion
Over the past few years, in our frequent episodes of tax
"reform," we have tended to look for tax remedies to too
many of our problems economic and otherwise. By now, it is
almost an article of faith to some people that tax policy is the
most important determinant of business investment. Perhaps
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this is only predictable, because a business lobbyist who can
wheedle a tax preference from the Congress can deliver to his
clients risk-free cash flow, while an engineer or designer can
only give his firm a roll of the dice in the free and competitive
market.
As difficult as it may be, though, we must question those
new preconceptions of taxation as the key to our future. After
all, if tax incentives are so important, how did our nation grow
so fast before it even had an income tax? Was Christopher
Columbus really sailing for Washington to make the case for
an exploration tax credit? Did anyone really argue whether
the wagon trains were depreciable or not?
As one who has specialized in the economics of taxation, I
can only report my opinion: that tax policy is crucial to our
economy now only because it has been stretched beyond all
reasonable bounds, to interfere in sector after sector. If it were
drawn back, the economy would thrive in the short run, after
some transition pains, only because it would be freed from the
shackles that the current tax law imposes. In the long run, our
economic prospects would depend on our ingenuity and
energy. No one can guarantee that those qualities will be
enough in an ever more competitive world economy, but for
myself, I would rather rely on our energy and ingenuity than
on some purported incentive in an incomprehensible tax law.
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Fiscal Illusion and
Fiscal Reality:
Do the Budget "Deficits" Have Clothes?
Laurence J. Kotlikoff
Boston University and
National Bureau of Economic Research

Fiscal policy has been a hot topic in recent years and
remains so today. No wonder. Since 1981 the federal govern
ment has made substantial cuts in personal income taxes,
provided the largest investment incentives in the country's
history, significantly altered the projected course of Social
Security benefits, and run enormous official budget deficits.
However, all this fiscal action has apparently just whetted the
appetites of fiscal enthusiasts who are now proposing what
has been billed as fundamental tax reform.
My focus in this talk is not to review recent fiscal history or
presage current tax reform bills, but to discuss an issue that
has bothered me repeatedly over the past few years. Put
simply, my question is the following: in thinking about fiscal
policy and particularly about government debt, have we been
taken in by the accountants and have we, as a result, been
missing the economic forest for the trees? I hope to convince
you that the answer, if not yes, is at least maybe. My sniping
at economic accounting is not to disparage the accounting
profession; indeed my real gripe is not with accountants, but
rather with economists who are so often misled by the labeling
of economic variables and then compound the error by
misleading others.
Before I turn to substantive points, let me say that I am not
arguing for different or better accounting. In my view, ac55
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counting is properly chosen after, not before, one chooses
one's economic model. The accounting constructs that are
appropriate for one model may be totally inappropriate for
another. For example, while one can conceive of a model in
which the government's current definition of the deficit is
meaningful, one can also write down other models in which
the current definition has little or no relation to the govern
ment's fundamental debt policy. Unfortunately, economists,
when speaking publicly, typically fail to explicate their models
and take the easy route of discussing the official numbers that
are available and generally familiar, despite the fact that these
numbers may be highly misleading indicators of the numbers
actually suggested by their theories.
In this and other respects, we are tyrannized by our
accounting. Somehow or other, official numbers invite con
cern and comment, and, when research funding is available,
official numbers also invite investigation. A prime example is
the industry of international finance economists who investi
gate changes in countries' balances of payment. Fortunately,
we do not keep balance of payment accounts for each state in
the U.S. or we would have an industry of economists studying
the balance of payments crisis between Michigan and Tennes
see and related nonsense.
Let me illustrate my concern about fiscal illusion by asking
you to consider the Social Security taxes you pay to the
government. Notice that the word "taxes" has been ascribed
to the Social Security payments you and your employer send
to the government. But why is the word "taxes" used? It's
used because some accountant or economist arbitrarily chose
that word back in 1936 or thereabouts. Suppose we label these
payments to the government differently. Let's label them
"loans" from you to the government. You may object to this
nomenclature, but bear with it for the moment.
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Loans are typically repaid, so let's also label Social Security
benefit payments "return of principal plus interest." Note that
from your point of view the new terminology is not completely
foreign. With the new language, you can now think of
yourselves as lending money to the government (in the form of
Social Security contributions) during your working years and
receiving principal plus interest (in the form of Social Security
benefit payments) during your retirement. Surely this se
quence of payments and receipts is very similar to those
associated with purchasing a government Treasury bond.
When you purchase a Treasury bond or other security, you
make payments to the government now in exchange for future
receipts from the government. Hence, from your point of
view, your payment of what is called Social Security "taxes"
is, in most respects, equivalent to your purchase of a govern
ment liability. While the mean return and risk properties of
your invisible Social Security bonds differ from those of
official government bonds, such differences in risk properties
provide no basis for labeling one set of payments to the
government "taxes" and the other set of payments "loans."
Let's now make the invisible Social Security bonds visible
by supposing that the federal government, starting at the
inception of the Social Security system, had also adopted the
language of lending and borrowing to describe its flows of
payments from and to the public sector and, indeed, had
issued explicit Social Security bonds to the public in exchange
for Social Security contributions. We are supposing then that
Social Security system sends a piece of paper marked Social
Security bond to each worker in exchange for his or her Social
Security contribution.
Consider now the impact on the government's measure of
official debt of switching from the "tax" and "transfer"
language to the language of "lending" and "repayment." As
you can read in the Appendix to chapter 4 of the 1982
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Economic Report of the President, this change in language,
while involving no change in fundamentals, would have
radically altered current and past reports of the federal debt
and federal deficits. The government would have reported
official deficits in the 1960s over $300 billion dollars for several
years and deficits over $100 billion dollars for most years
during the 1960s and 1970s. Since the price level and size of
the economy was much smaller then than now, as a fraction of
GNP these alternative deficit figures would swamp those of
recent years. With this alternative labeling of Social Security
receipts and payments 1985 official government debt would
exceed its current $1.5 trillion value by a factor of roughly 5.
Presumably, such a redefinition of official government
liabilities would raise the question of classifying other implicit
commitments to future expenditures as government debt. If
one is willing to label implicit promises to pay future retire
ment benefits official liabilities, why not include implicit
expenditure commitments to maintain the national parks, to
defend the country, or to provide minimum sustenance to the
poor?
A heated debate about the appropriate definition of gov
ernment debt would likely lead some shrewd economist to
suggest eliminating official government debt and deficits en
tirely by just using some more of what is essentially innovative
accounting. This economist would suggest that rather than
raise additional funds by issuing government securities, the
government should simply levy a head "tax" per adult
promising to provide each adult in the following or some
subsequent year a refundable tax credit equal to the "tax" plus
interest on the "tax." If the adult died before repayment, the
"tax" credit would be paid to his or her estate. Furthermore,
those who are liquidity-constrained would be permitted to
borrow against their future "tax" credits.
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The equality, in present value, between each household's
head tax and its head tax credit leaves household budgets and,
therefore, private behavior unaltered. However, since future
tax credits, like future Social Security benefit payments, are
not reported in the current federal budget, this policy permits
the government to report a smaller deficit. If the head tax is
sufficiently large, the government could potentially eliminate
not only this year's official deficit, but indeed the entire stock
of outstanding government debt. If it made the head "tax"
sufficiently large, the government could report a very substan
tial surplus. Those of you who are following closely the details
of this head "tax" "tax" credit policy will see that it
effectively amounts to relabeling as "taxes" the receipts the
government obtains from selling bonds, and relabeling as
"tax" credits the payments made by the government of
interest plus principal on its sale of bonds.
To summarize, I've pointed out that with a little change in
labeling of Social Security receipts and payments, the govern
ment's reported debt would be roughly five times its current
value; alternatively, with a little relabeling of the money it
receives and pays out in its bond transactions, the government
could wipe out any reported debt and report instead enor
mous surpluses. But my point is not that we can color red
what is really black or color black what is really red. My point
is that in most economic models, particularly the standard
neoclassical model, there is really no fundamental distinction
between what is currently painted red and what is currently
painted black, i.e., in most models there are no real reds and
blacks when it comes to labeling government receipts and
payments.
If I have you scratching your heads, I'm happy. I'm
delighted if you believe, as do I, that money which the
government calls taxes could just as well be called borrowing

60

and vice versa. But if I've gotten you to agree with me that our
official debt numbers are inherently arbitrary, then you should
also agree that these numbers provide little guide to the
fundamental stance of fiscal policy. If we can't rely on these
numbers, how do we go about assessing the extent of redis
tribution from younger to older generations, which is what
most economists and perhaps most noneconomists associate
with the concern about government debt?
The answer is that we need to examine directly the lifetime
budget constraints of different generations and ask whether
government policies have expanded the lifetime consumption
opportunities of older generations at the price of reduced
lifetime consumption opportunities of younger and future
generations. The answer to this question is invariant to how
we label particular receipts and payments between the private
economy and the government. Accounting doesn't matter
when looking at a generation's budget constraint because the
bottom line is how much can the generation afford to
consume; this depends on the generations' lifetime receipts
from the government net of payments to the government, not
on how particular receipts and payments are labeled.
Once one becomes attuned to thinking about economic
debt policy in terms of intergenerational redistribution, it
becomes clear that a variety of government policies, many of
which have no direct effect on reported government deficits,
transfer resources from later to earlier generations. Before
describing these mechanisms, it's worth mentioning why one
should care about intergenerational redistribution towards
older generations. The answer is that, as a result of such a
transfer, older generations are likely to increase their con
sumption by more than younger generations lower their
consumption. The reason is that older generations have fewer
years left to live and consequently have fewer years over which
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to consume the additional resources. Younger generations, on
the other hand, spread their reduction in lifetime resources
over more years; hence, their response to the transfer is to
lower their consumption this year somewhat, knowing they
will also lower their consumption for many years in the future.
In the jargon of economists, older generations are likely to
have larger marginal propensities to consume than younger
generations. If this is true, then intergenerational redistribu
tion will eventuate in an increase in total national consump
tion and, according to neoclassical models, a decline in total
national saving. The decline in saving may also spell a decline
in investment and higher real interest rates as capital becomes
a relatively scarce factor of production.
Economists and others in the U.S. are properly concerned
abut this crowding-out process. Since 1980 we have been
saving only 4.7 percent of our net national product. In
contrast, we saved 7.8 percent of NNP in the 1970s, 8.7
percent in the 1960s, and 8.8 percent in the 1950s. While the
current saving rate of 5.2 percent is above that of the early
1980s, it is still 41 percent lower than the saving rate of the
1950s.
In addition to redistributing to older generations by cutting
"taxes" now and raising "taxes" in the future, i.e., reducing
payments from the private sector to the government now and
increasing such payments in the future, the government
employs several other mechanisms of intergenerational redis
tribution, some of which are quite subtle. One somewhat
subtle mechanism is running an unfunded, "pay as you go"
Social Security system.
In this Ponzi scheme, younger working generations pay
money to Social Security which hands the money over to
older, retired generations in the form of retirement benefits. In
this scheme, every generation pays for the retirement benefits
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of the previous generation with one exception; at the initiation
of the program the first generation receives benefits without
having to finance the retirement of its immediate predecessors.
This generation receives a windfall at the expense of younger
and future generations whose lifetime budgets would be
greater were they not enrolled in Social Security.
While many of the big winners from Social Security are
already deceased, there is still significant intergenerational
redistribution from Social Security. Middle income house
holds who were born in 1930 are predicted roughly to break
even from the system. In contrast, middle income households
in the cohort born in 1990 are projected over their lifetimes to
lose, on net, roughly $60,000 in present value as a consequence
of participating in Social Security.
Another subtle intergenerational transfer mechanism is
changes in the tax base that shift the burden of "taxation"
(payments to the government) from older to younger genera
tions. An example here is switching from an income tax that
taxes the capital income of the elderly as well as the labor
earnings of the young and middle-aged to a wage tax that hits
only the young and middle-aged. A variant of this type of
fundamental debt policy is increases in the progressivity of the
income tax. Switching from a less to a more progressive
income tax shifts more of the tax burden onto middle-aged
and younger workers whose annual incomes are larger than
those of retired elderly for whom income consists simply of
the return on savings.
Perhaps the most subtle mechanism of intergenerational
redistribution is government policies that lower the market
value of financial assets. Since older generations are the
primary owners of assets, a reduction in asset values reduces
the consumption opportunities of the elderly; at the same
time, it expands the consumption opportunities of younger
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generations who, through time, can purchase these assets from
older generations at a lower price.
An example of such a policy is reducing investment incen
tives, which, by the way, is part of the President's tax reform
proposal. Since investment incentives in the U.S. are effec
tively restricted to new investment, old capital, capital that has
been fully or partially written off, sells at a discount reflecting
the preferential tax treatment available to new capital. A
reduction in investment incentives means a smaller discount
on old capital, i.e., a capital gain to owners of old capital. This
capital gain accrues to older generations, and young and
middle-aged generations are worse off because they must pay
a higher price to acquire claims to the economy's capital
stock.
Having pointed out these various mechanisms for running
true economic debt policies and having argued strongly that
one cannot gauge these policies by looking at official debt
numbers, it's time to look at the reality of recent economic
debt policy. The Reagan personal income tax cuts have
certainly enhanced the lifetime budgets of older generations at
the expense of younger generations, but, up to the present, the
magnitude of this intergenerational redistribution appears
small when set against the massive intergenerational redistri
bution in the 1960s and 1970s associated with Social Security.
A second feature of Reagan's fiscal policy is the sizable
investment incentives passed in 1981. As argued above, this
policy generates capital losses to owners of existing (old)
capital and constitutes an economic surplus policy. My sense
of the magnitude of this redistribution when set against the
redistribution from the tax cuts is that it corresponds, very
roughly, to having postponed the tax cuts by one year.
The third significant fiscal policy altering the intergenera
tional resource distribution is the 1983 Social Security reform.
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From the perspective of at least 1977, Social Security's
long-run finances seemed fairly secure. But the ensuing reces
sions and other economic and demographic events changed
the long- as well as short-run picture. The 1983 reforms made
very substantial cuts in the future benefits of all current young
generations. The new Social Security law gradually raises the
retirement age to 67 and envisions, through the process of
bracket creep, the eventual income taxation of Social Security
benefits of all retirees, not simply high income retirees as is
now the case.
For current young generations, these legislated long-term
cuts in Social Security benefits are very sizable when com
pared, for example, with the tax savings they have enjoyed to
date from the Reagan tax cut. Hence this policy also repre
sents a significant economic surplus policy since it is reducing
the welfare of current young generations while improving the
projected welfare of future generations.
My assessment is that the Reagan fiscal policy has, to date,
generated, on net, a small economic surplus, although this
assessment could change signs if tax rates are not raised in the
near future. However, whether one views the policy in toto as
transferring to older or to younger generations, it is clear that
the national hysteria concerning deficits has been predicated
on a set of numbers that have little or no relationship to the
issue of fundamental concern. Asserting that the deficit num
bers have no clothes is not the same as asserting that all is fine
in our economic house. On the contrary, it appears clear that
the country is experiencing a secular decline in saving which
may well be the result of the unreported enormous economic
deficits associated with Social Security in the last three
decades.
In closing, let me point out that a very real problem with the
current fixation on the official budget deficit is that once that
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number is fixed, through either a real or an accounting policy,
the public and the government will lose interest in the question
of debt, and, indeed, may return to the kinds of hidden debt
policies of the last 30 years. It is high time to remove the
blinders. Fiscal illusion is a very real problem; it not only
blinds us to current fiscal reality, it also leaves us very little
guide to improving our economic future.
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Federal Tax Reform:
State and Local Perspective
Ronald C. Fisher
Michigan State University

Introduction*
As you know, the nation is now embroiled in a debate
concerning the merits of major structural reform of the federal
income tax system involving both the broadening of the tax
base by elimination of exclusions, exemptions, and deduc
tions, and the reduction of both the number and progressivity
of rate brackets. A central element of nearly all such tax
reform plans is curtailment or elimination of the itemized
deduction for state and local taxes now available to individual
taxpayers. Therefore, I will discuss first how federal tax
reform might directly affect state and local governments, and
second, how those subnational governments might respond to
the federal tax changes. The potential pattern of winners and
losers among the states will be discussed, and how state and
local governments might be able to offset some of the effects
of curtailment of federal deductibility and other reform
changes by altering their own fiscal structure and behavior will
be considered.
Before considering the tax reform proposals specifically, it
may be useful to note the opinion of several experts regarding
tax reform. In introducing his tax reform proposal to the
nation in May of 1985, President Reagan concluded that "The
tax system has come to be unAmerican." In contrast, Senator
Russell Long, at one time chairman of the Senate Finance
"These comments were first offered as a lecture in January 1986. A postscript has been added
to incorporate details of the tax bill adopted by Congress in September 1986.
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Committee (the committee which considers tax policy in the
U.S. Senate) noted in 1967 that
Many businessmen contribute to legislators who
have fought against taxes that would have been
burdensome to their businesses, whether the tax
increase was proposed as a so-called reform, a
loophole closer, or just an effort to balance the
federal budget.
(Congregational Record, April 4, 1967.)
Finally, at an unknown date and regarding an unknown topic,
Yogi Berra is reported to have said: "It's deja vu all over
again."
Obviously, these views are very different. The President, on
the one hand, argues that the tax system, with its myriad
exclusions, deductions, and credits, is unAmerican, and per
haps that it is unpatriotic to support the current tax structure
and oppose major reform. In response, the President offered
what he called "America's tax plan." But Senator Long, with
long tax experience in the Congress, had a very different
notion. He argued that businessmen will contribute to politi
cal officials in an attempt to protect their own economic
interest. Rather than being unAmerican, Senator Long sug
gests that this behavior is typical of and fully expected in
American politics. I think we can expand his notion of
businessmen to almost everyone. Certainly we have recently
observed that state and local government officials and their
representatives can be equally as active, and perhaps equally
as effective, as businessmen in trying to influence the Congress
when it comes to tax reform. And, as Mr. Berra noted, it is
deja vu all over again! The tax code which the President
characterized as unAmerican developed over many years, not
instantly. In addition, most of the ideas included in the current
tax reform proposals have been proposed and debated in the

69

past, at least over the last 25 years. And what Senator Long
observed in 1967 is equally true today.
What, then, is different about the current tax reform
debate? Perhaps it is that in the past, reform proposals have
largely come from experts economists, lawyers, and oth
ers outside of government, while recently those same pro
posals have been offered first by several Senators and Repre
sentatives, then by the U.S. Treasury, and, most recently, by
the President.

Review of Recent Proposals
Although a number of different tax reform plans were
introduced in Congress in the past three years, let us concen
trate here on the developments beginning with the release, in
November 1984, of a proposal developed by the U.S. Depart
ment of the Treasury at the President's request. That propos
al, which came to be called Treasury I, would have increased
the personal exemption and standard deduction, generally
eliminated the itemized deductions (except in a very few
cases), and indexed the tax structure for inflation, not only
including indexation of tax rates, the personal exemption and
the standard deduction, but also indexation in calculation of
depreciation as well as interest and other capital income.
Fringe benefits, such as employer-provided health insurance,
would have been added to the tax base in a substantial way.
Tax rates would have been confined to brackets of 15 percent,
25 percent, and 35 percent. Business deductions would have
been reduced or eliminated, the investment tax credit repealed,
and the corporate tax rate set at 33 percent. The tax system
would certainly have been simpler in what truly would have
been significant reform.
In May of 1985, the President moved away from Treasury I,
introducing his own tax reform plan, entitled "The President's
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Tax Proposals to the Congress for Fairness, Growth, and
Simplicity," which came to be called Treasury II and referred
to here as the President's Plan. This second plan encompassed
major tax reform, but was substantially different from the
original proposal in several important areas. Some itemized
deductions, for example for charitable contributions, found
their way back into the tax structure. The broad taxation of
fringe benefits which had been proposed in Treasury I was
effectively eliminated in Treasury II. The remaining proposed
taxation of health insurance, for example, was effectively
insignificant. A minimum tax was created to force individuals
or firms which would not have liabilities under the general
rules to pay some amount of tax. The second plan followed
the first in raising personal exemptions and the standard
deduction and using three rate classes (15 percent, 25 percent,
35 percent).
With the President's proposal in hand, the Congress went to
work. The House considered the issue throughout the summer
and into the fall. Negotiations were alternately going forward
at full speed and the next day breaking down. Finally, the
House Ways and Means Committee reported out a bill, under
the direction of chairman Rostenkowski, and in December the
House passed a tax reform bill. This plan was substantially
different from the proposal which the President had offered in
May, and even more substantially different than the original
Treasury proposal of the previous November.
First of all, the itemized deduction for state and local taxes
was still allowed under the House bill; it would not have been
under either of the two Reagan/Treasury proposals. A major
issue of confrontation, therefore, was how to treat state and
local taxes. There also was substantial difference in the
treatment of fringe benefits. While the Reagan proposal
would tax fringes less than the original Treasury proposal, the
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House proposal does so even less, so much so that, for all
practical purposes, fringe benefits are not taxed in the House
bill at all. The House proposal added a fourth rate bracket at
38 percent, which would apply to joint returns with adjusted
gross income at or about $100,000 a year. The concept of the
minimum tax which found its way into President Reagan's
proposal was also retained in the House proposal.
In some ways, it is as interesting to consider what these
various tax reform proposals do not do. For example, social
security income will not be taxed more than it is currently.
Apparently, social security income is just politically untouch
able. The credit for business research and development activ
ities is maintained. In a national sense, this credit is not very
substantial, but it turns out to be very important to firms in
Michigan. While the original Treasury proposal adopted more
or less complete indexation of the tax code for inflation
applying to all of the nominal dollar amounts in the tax code
as well as the definition of capital income, the political process
has reduced the degree of indexation substantially. Interest
ingly, despite substantial popular discussion over the last three
or four years about flat taxes, none of the proposals is truly a
flat tax, that is, with one rate. Some progressivity in the rate
structure is maintained.
During the tax reform debate, state and local government
officials and their representative interest groups have generally
been vocal critics of all the tax reform proposals. They have
criticized the notion of ending the deduction for state and
local government taxes. They have been vocal critics of
changing the definition of the kinds of activities for which
state and local governments can sell bonds, the interest from
which is not taxed as income in the federal code. In general,
states are concerned about the interstate distribution of tax
savings from reform and about how the loss of deductibility
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might affect the ability of state and local governments to raise
taxes in the future or continue to provide financing for current
services. Each of those concerns is now considered.

First Concern: Interstate Distribution of Tax Savings
Early consideration of the likely effects of tax reform for
states focused on the implication for the interstate distribution
of federal tax reductions (or interstate increases) caused by
reform. Federal tax reform will not be geographically neutral.
The residents of some states will benefit more than the
residents of others, if for no other reason than federal tax
reform treats different income taxpayers differently, and states
differ in their income distributions. The U.S. Department of
the Treasury estimated that the President's proposal would
have reduced personal income taxes by 7 percent in aggregate,
with nearly 60 percent of taxpayers receiving some reductions.
Thus, the likely concern is the relative amount of tax reduction
by state, i.e., which states have less than a 7 percent aggregate
reduction and which more. To date, the Treasury Department
has not released or published any state-by-state analysis of the
tax reform plan's effect.
One often gets the impression from state and local govern
ment officials that the interstate distribution of personal tax
reduction caused by tax reform arises almost entirely from
changing the deduction for state and local taxes. They suggest,
obviously, that states with both a relatively large fraction of
taxpayers who itemize deductions and relatively large
amounts of deductible taxes stand to "lose" most from
eliminating the deduction. But many, if not all, of the tax
features affected by the reform plans have uneven effects on
the distribution of taxes among the states. Similarly, those tax
features not curtailed (or perhaps even enhanced) by the plan
also are significant for any interstate variation in tax burdens.
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These features, too, are not expected to be geographically
neutral. This fact has been noted by Business Week:
The nondeductibility of state and local taxes is but
one factor, and probably not the most important
one, determining states' futures.... If the tax plan is
enacted in its present form there will be substantial
variations in its regional impact. But which states
and regions emerge as the biggest gainers and losers
may be surprising. (June 17, 1985.)
For example, long-term nonresidential capital gain income
varies greatly by state. The President's tax reform proposal
(Treasury II) would have decreased the taxation of capital
gains, while the House bill would have raised capital gains
taxes slightly. In 1981, half of all taxable capital gains income
accrued to residents of just six states: California, Colorado,
Florida, Illinois, New York, and Texas. That fact understates
the concentration, because nearly 35 percent of total capital
gains income that year went to residents of only three states:
California (16 percent), Texas (10 percent), New York (9
percent). If the deduction for state-local taxes were continued
and the revenue loss made up by increasing the tax on capital
gains, it is not clear that a state such as New York, whose
officials have been prominent in opposing the curtailment of
the state-local tax deduction, would be better off. That is, the
distribution of any tax change needs to be compared to the
distributional effects of the substitute tax provision.
As a second example, Clark and Neubig (1984) report the
volume of new, private purpose tax exempt bonds issued in
1983 by state. The President's tax reform plan would eliminate
the interest exemption for many of these state-local bonds.
But the list of the 10 largest state users of this exemption in
1983 includes Texas (2), Florida (3), Arizona (8), and Virginia
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(9), none of which are states usually identified as likely losers
from ending the state-local tax deduction.
Finally, while all of the tax reform proposals would end the
double personal exemption for senior citizens, both the Pres
ident's and the House plans would expand the credit for low
income taxpayers, including low income elderly taxpayers.
Most of the analyses which I have seen suggest that low
income elderly taxpayers would be substantially better off
under either tax reform plan, while higher income elderly
taxpayers would have smaller than average tax reductions.
But of all elderly taxpayers with 1981 income less than
$10,000, nearly 40 percent lived in just six states: California,
Florida, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Texas. Again,
several states often classified as "losers" from elimination of
the deduction for state and local taxes apparently stand to
"gain" from this change in the treatment of elderly taxpayers.
In other words, it is not easy to determine which states'
residents will be winners and which will be losers, on average,
from the distribution of federal tax changes. As the tax reform
proposals are adjusted, maintaining revenue neutrality, there
may certainly be some surprises about the geographic effects
of those changes. And to the extent that the tax reform plan
would tax currently exempt or excluded activities, state-bystate data may not be available (certainly from tax sources) to
estimate the effects.
It may be possible to estimate the interstate distribution of
personal tax changes due to reform indirectly, however, if one
is willing to assume that all of the changes can be reflected by
income. The U.S. Treasury Department estimated, for the
President's tax plan, the expected percentage reductions in
personal taxes by income class. That information can be
combined with income distribution data for each state to
estimate the aggregate percentage personal tax reductions for

75

residents of each state. 1 (See Table 1). Those calculations were
done by an undergraduate student at Michigan State, Lori
Brown, and me, using 1981 data. Essentially, we considered
what the effect of the President's tax proposal would have
been in 1981.
Table 1
Interstate Distribution of Tax Features
Federal Tax Change Due to Reform
As a Percentage of

United States
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Dist. Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota

Disposable Income

Federal Tax

1.21%
1.15%
1.51%
1.17%
1.10%
1.18%
1.33%
1.43%
1.50%
1.36%
1.32%
1.28%
1.16%
1.08%
1.30%
1.26%
1.13%
1.23%
1.14%
1.26%
1.24%
1.35%
1.41%
1.14%
1.16%

9.54%
7.21%
9.01%
10.17%
8.82%
8.65%
8.46%
9.48%
9.11%
9.32%
10.01%
9.27%
9.71%
8.65%
8.78%
9.06%
8.64%
9.35%
8.38%
10.75%
8.65%
9.72%
8.51%
8.91%

Capital Gains
Income as
% of Total

Percent of Aged
& Blind Returns
With Income
< $10,000

0.9%
0.3%
1.5%
0.7%
15.7%
2.6%
1.5%
0.2%
0.4%
7.3%
1.7%
0.4%
0.4%
5.0%
1.1%
1.3%
1.3%
1.5%
1.4%
0.3%
1.3%
2.0%
2.0%
1.6%

0.9%
0.1%
1.0%
1.1%
8.4%
1.0%
1.7%
0.2%
0.4%
6.6%
1.5%
0.4%
0.5%
4.7%
2.3%
2.0%
1.1%
1.4%
0.8%
0.5%
1.7%
3.3%
3.7%
2.5%

9.04%

76

Table 1
Interstate Distribution of Tax Features—Cont.
Federal Tax Change Due to Reform
As a Percentage of

Percent of Aged
& Blind Returns
With Income
< $10,000

Disposable Income

Federal Tax

Capital Gains
Income as
% of Total

1.15%
1.21%
1.16%
1.16%
1.45%
1.39%
1.32%
1.24%
1.26%
1.17%
1.11%
1.31%
1.30%
1.12%
1.28%
1.27%
1.25%
1.03%
1.18%
1 .44%
1.07%
1.22%
1.37%
1.25%
1.19%
1.20%
1.32%

9.84%

0.7%

0.9%

8.76%

1.9%

9.60%
9.72%
9.37%
9.57%
8.50%
9.35%
9.07%
9.72%
9.03%
9.30%
8.93%
8.91%
9.32%
10.12%
10.31%
9.81%
9.33%
8.78%
9.05%
9.98%
9.38%
8.43%
9.29%
9.02%
8.06%

0.4%
0.9%
0.7%
0.4%
1.9%
0.7%
9.1%
2.0%
0.3%
2.4%
1.8%
1.6%
2.4%
0.3%
0.6%
0.6%
1.2%
10.0%
0.7%
0.1%
1.5%
2.0%
0.3%
1.9%
0.6%

3.1%
0.6%
1.0%
0.4%
0.6%
3.4%
0.4%
8.1%
2.3%
0.4%
5.7%
1.2%
1.4%
5.5%
0.4%
1.0%
0.6%
1.6%
5.6%
0.5%
0.3%
1.9%
1.7%
0.7%
2.8%
0.7%

Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
Source: L. Brown (1986).

We found that adoption of only the personal tax changes in
the President's tax plan would have increased disposable
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personal income an average of 1.21 percent, with a range from
1.03 percent in South Dakota to 1.51 percent in Alaska.
Michigan residents, by the way, would have had a 1.14
percent increase in disposable personal income. Measured
instead in terms of percentage tax decreases, the results show
an average 9 percent decrease in personal taxes, with a range
of 8.4 percent in Louisiana to 10.8 percent in Maine. Again,
Michigan is slightly below the average at 8.5 percent. Al
though this is an admittedly rough approximation, the pattern
of results is similar to those derived by others who examine the
effects of specific details of the tax plan. The results suggest
that while federal tax reform will not be neutral between
residents of different states, the differences between states are
not likely to be very substantial, certainly not to the degree
which has been suggested.
There is one important qualification to all of this. The
notion of reduced taxes for individuals as a result of federal
tax reform is an illusion. Because the proposed tax plans are
designed to raise the same amount of revenue as the current
structure would have raised, at least by estimation, there will
be no reduction of total taxes. In essence, the intent is for
increased corporate tax collections to substitute for reduced
personal tax collections, with total taxes remaining the same.
The tax systems proposed in the various plans are designed to
withdraw approximately the same amount of resources from
the private economy as the current structure. The myth of
individual tax reduction is created by separating personal and
corporate tax payments, and then ignoring the corporate
payments. For this to make any sense requires that corpora
tions operate as "black holes," where taxes enter, never to
reappear. This is nonsense. The tax collected from corpora
tions may cause higher prices or lower wages or lower returns
on investment, all of which affect individuals. What tax reform
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will do is alter the distribution of the tax burden among
individuals.

Second Concern: Effect on Subnational
Government Programs
The second issue about federal tax reform which concerns
state and local government officials is whether curtailment of
the deduction for state and local taxes will affect the ability of
the states to finance services. The marginal price of state and
local government services to taxpayers who itemize federal tax
deductions is increased if state and local taxes can no longer
be deducted. This increase in tax prices could, in some cases,
actually bring about reductions from current state or local
spending levels or, more likely, would slow the growth of
state-local spending by making it harder to further increase
state or local tax rates. For instance, the Wall Street Journal
reported the Alaska revenue commissioner's fear that "resi
dents would resist the need for new or higher revenue
collections if the U.S. stops allowing taxpayers to deduct their
local tax payments," (June 11,1985, p. 58). Because the loss of
deductibility would particularly raise tax burdens for higher
income taxpayers, there is concern that some might want to
leave high tax states or cities. Thus, New York Governor
Mario Cuomo is quoted as saying "They're pitting state
against state. A lot of my people will leave New York so that
they can live where their taxes are lower" (Business Week,
June 17, 1985).
First of all, it is important to emphasize that even if
deductibility is retained in a federal tax reform plan, the value
of that deduction would be reduced, and thus the subsidy to
state and local governments would also be reduced. The value
of the state-local tax deduction will be substantially eroded by
the other features of reform. A larger standard deduction,
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cutbacks in other allowed itemized deductions, and the greater
personal exemption for nonitemizers which is part of the
House plan, would all reduce the number of itemizers, so that
fewer taxpayers would be deducting state-local taxes. Even for
those taxpayers who would still itemize (and thus deduct
state-local taxes) the value of the deduction will be smaller
because tax rates will be lower. Some estimates suggest that as
much as half of the current value of deductibility would be lost
even if deductibility remains in the tax code. Therefore, part of
the loss of the state-local government subsidy occurs generally
as the result of tax reform (even if that specific deduction is
retained) and part because of the curtailment of the deduction.
Will the loss of deductibility or the reduced value of
deductibility matter? Evidence is sparse, but seems to show
that deductibility has induced states and localities to increase
spending slightly and to favor certain revenue sources (deduct
ible taxes, for example) over others. A reduction of deduci
bility's value, then, might reduce state-local taxes slightly (or
more correctly, slow their growth) and induce states to alter
their tax structures. I expect that local governments, in many
cases, will be affected less by the decreased value of deduct
ibility than state governments because of state tax incentives.
Local taxes (mostly property taxes) are deductible against
state income taxes in 33 states, while 30 states have state
credits for local property taxes (including Michigan). A
number obviously have both. These features will become more
important and will mitigate the effect on property taxpayers of
a reduction in or loss of federal deductibility.
The following example, based on the Michigan property tax
credit, illustrates that point. Consider a family of four with a
$40,000 income, which pays $2,400 in property taxes and has
a total of $5,000 in federal itemized deductions. Such a family
receives a Michigan property tax credit of $600 and is in the 25
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percent federal income tax rate bracket. As a result, an
increase in property taxes of $1 would actually cost this family
only $.30, after the federal deduction and the state credit. If
the federal income tax is changed so that the personal
exemption rises (to $2,000) and tax rates are reduced (this
family is now in the 15 percent federal rate class), then the
family's cost of a $1 property tax increase rises to $.40 if no
deduction for state and local taxes is allowed and to $.34 if the
deduction is retained.
First, this family's local tax cost rises due to federal tax
reform even if deductibility is retained. Second, the increases
in local tax cost due to federal tax reform (with or without
deductibility) are small. The loss of federal deductibility
increases this family's marginal property tax cost from $.30 to
$.40, not from $.75 to $1.00, which would occur without the
state credit. Without deductibility, the state credit becomes
more important and offsets a larger amount of local taxes.
Exhibit 1
Marginal Property Tax Cost in Michigan:
Deduction/Homestead Credit Illustration
$40,000 Income; 4 Exemptions
$80,000 House; 60 Mill Tax Rate
$5,000 Itemized Deductions
Homestead Credit = 60% ($2,400-$ 1,400) =
600
Marginal Property Tax Cost = .4(1-7),
where t = federal marginal tax rate of
itemizer
Homestead Credit = $600
Current Structure
Federal Taxable Income = $31,000
Federal Marginal Tax Rate = 25%
Marginal Property Tax Cost = $.30
Federal Reform-No Deduction: Homestead Credit = $600
Federal Taxable Income = $28,000
Federal Marginal Tax Rate = 15%
Marginal Property Tax Cost = $.40
Federal Reform-With Deduction: Homestead Credit = $600
Federal Taxable Income = $27,000
Federal Marginal Tax Rate = 15%
Marginal Property Tax Cost = $.34

Fiscal Details
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Summary: Marginal Property Tax Cost

___________________Tax Structure_____
Current, Reform,
Deducibility Current Reform No Credit No Credit
$ .85
$ .75
134
130
Yes
$1.00
$1.00
$.40
$.40
No

One should also keep in mind that it is possible that the
demand for state-local government services would rise be
cause of other effects of federal tax reform. One such factor
may be the change in the deduction (and thus subsidy) for
other goods and services which may be strong substitutes for
or complements to current subnational government services.
Two potential cases may be charitable activities, the subsidy
for which would be reduced because of lower marginal tax
rates and the end of the charitable deduction for nonitemizers,
and housing, which would be affected by lower rates and the
possible loss of the deductions for property taxes and interest
on second homes. These changes are expected to increase the
marginal costs of both charitable contributions and housing
consumption. One might expect that the activities of many
charitable organizations are substitutes for state and local
government services and expenditures, and it is known that
charitable contributions are substantially more price-sensitive
than is the demand for state-local goods. Thus one expects a
relatively large decline in individual charitable contributions
due to federal tax reform, which could increase the demand
for government spending on similar services. The effect of
changes in housing demand are more problematic, partly
because the base for local property taxes as well as demand for
services could be affected.
Finally, because the Treasury Department estimates that
personal income taxes would decrease by 7 percent overall
under the President's plan, with more than 58 percent of
individual taxpayers enjoying some decrease, disposable per-

82

sonal income would increase for some taxpayers. Such an
income gain implies an increase in the demand for subnational
government spending. Nonitemizers are particularly expected
to enjoy net tax decreases (that is, income increases) as a result
of the reform plan. So while the desired level of state-local
spending might fall for current itemizers because of the
increased price, desired state-local spending by nonitemizers
would increase. And nationally, only about 35 percent of
taxpayers have itemized deductions in recent years.
In a slightly different version of this second concern, Henry
Thomassen, an adviser to the Governor of Georgia, has
argued that the biggest problem for states from the loss of
deductibility is the redistribution of tax burden among dif
ferent income taxpayers. Mr. Thomassen writes:
Deductibility provides tax expenditures to individu
als rather than governments. Because of progressive
income tax systems, the benefits received then differ
greatly among individuals ... if deductibility were
suddenly ended, losses would be imposed upon
taxpayers in inequitable fashion. Today's itemizers
would carry an enlarged share of both the Federal
and the State and local taxes. (National Tax Journal,
September 1985.)
In response to this problem, states can, and I believe will,
change their own tax structures. States and localities currently
make use of some revenue sources, such as gasoline taxes,
license fees, and user charges, which are not deductible. Even
among deductible taxes there is wide variation in reliance and
structure across states. One avenue of response for states to
curtailment of the deduction, then, is change in their revenue
structure. But if states or localities do change their revenue
mix as a result of federal tax reform, this would also change
the equity and efficiency effects of the reform plan. States
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would want to reduce taxes on those residents who lose
because of curtailment of federal deductibility. Some options
are less progressive personal income tax rate structures and
more reliance on business taxes. The result is to work against
the incentives for those taxpayers to move or for those
taxpayers to demand less state spending. The burden of the
loss of deductibility gets spread over all taxpayers and thus the
magnitude of effects is reduced. I firmly believe that if federal
tax reform reduces the value of the state and local tax
deduction uniformly, the states will use fees and direct busi
ness taxes more heavily than in the past and will adopt less
progressive personal tax structures. If the state and local tax
deduction is reduced for only some state and local taxes (such
as the elimination of the deduction for sales taxes which was
finally adopted), then states will move away from use of the
tax which is no longer deductible.

Conclusions
Most economists believe that federal tax reform would be
more efficient and more attractive if the tax base is broadened
even more than is currently proposed, and thus tax rates
lowered more than currently proposed. Such a plan could be
fashioned by combining some features of the President's plan
(such as reducing deductions for state and local taxes, con
sumer interest payments, and some business expenses and
ending exemptions for some income from tax exempt bonds
and transfer payments) with some features of the House bill
(such as increased taxation of capital gains income, an
effective minimum tax, and a two-tiered personal exemption).
This evening I have considered some of the ways federal tax
reform might affect state and local governments. It appears
that tax reform will not be neutral among the states, although
the differences in changes in tax liabilities among states will

84

likely be small. The loss of federal deductibility of state and
local taxes and tax reform in general will increase the marginal
cost of state and local tax increases. The result will likely be a
small decrease in state and local taxes, but much of that effect
may be offset by changes in state and local governments' tax
structure, particularly by moving away from taxes which are
no longer deductible or by adopting less progressive statelocal tax systems.
In terms of the states' position about tax reform, my point
of view is that the potential effects on the states have generally
been overblown. State and local government concerns about
federal tax reform have also been somewhat misdirected, in
focusing almost exclusively on the loss of deductibility. Other
aspects of the tax reform plan, particularly the decreased
amount of itemizing and the lower rates, will have almost as
big an effect for state and local governments as the loss of
deductibility per se.
Regardless of these effects, no one sector of the economy
should dictate the nature or possibility of tax reform. I think
it is necessary to move away from thinking about how tax
reform will affect Joe, how it will affect Michigan, how it will
affect the computer industry, or how it will affect state and
local governments. We have to think of what tax reform can
do for our economy in an overall sense. It is only in that way
that the diffused positive effects of tax reform can outweigh
the apparent short-term costs to individual sectors.
The potential promise of tax reform is that taxes become
less important in economic decision making, less important at
the margin, as economists like to say. That is accomplished
largely through the lower tax rates. To maintain revenue
neutrality, the base in broadened, which improves fairness and
efficiency as well. Perhaps the clearest "winners" from tax
reform will be low income workers who will be removed from
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the tax rolls. And the clearest "losers" are likely to be high
income individuals with substantial capital investments, par
ticularly in tax shelters. That support for such a change arose
across the political spectrum is remarkable in itself.

Postscript: The Tax Reform Act of 1986 is Adopted
In June 1986, the Senate approved a new tax reform
proposal developed by the Senate Finance Committee under
the direction of Chairman Packwood. The Senate bill, which
in retrospect appears to have been the key to ensuring broad
political support for reform, differed from the House proposal
in at least five important ways. The Senate plan included only
two tax rate classes for personal taxes, 15 and 27 percent. The
very low top rate made the package particularly attractive, but
required more base broadening to maintain revenue. There
fore, the Senate plan phased out the personal exemption for
families with incomes above $145,000, eliminated the deduc
tion for consumer interest (except on mortgages), ended the
deduction for state and local sales taxes, and continued
deductions for individual retirement accounts only for taxpay
ers not covered by pension plans. Similarly, the Senate plan
proposed lower corporate rates, but a broader base, than in
the House bill.
After lengthy and uncertain conference committee sessions
during the summer, agreement was reached on a compromise
plan in August. A fundamental federal income tax reform bill
was approved by the Congress in September. That version
maintains two formal personal tax rate classes (15 and 28
percent), phaseout of the personal exemption (which effec
tively imposes a higher marginal tax rate on high income
taxpayers), elimination of the deductions for consumer inter
est and state and local sales taxes, curtailment of the deduc
tion for IRA accounts and includes taxation of capital gains
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as ordinary income. Also, losses from most tax shelters,
so-called "passive" investments, may not be used to offset
income from other sources. On the corporate side, the top rate
is 34 percent with the investment tax credit repealed and many
deductions reduced or eliminated. Minimum taxes were added
for both individuals and corporations.
This proposal which emerged from the conference commit
tee was signed into law by President Reagan on October 22,
1986. The net effect is expected to be a substantial reduction in
personal tax collections (perhaps about 6 percent) and a
substantial increase in corporate tax collections.
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NOTE
1. This is far from a perfect procedure. In effect, it assumes that a taxpayer
with a given income can expect the same percentage reduction in personal
taxes regardless of state of residence.

6

Tax Reform, Poverty, and
Inequality
Sheldon Danziger
Institute for Research on Poverty
University of Wisconsin Madison

The Tax Reform Act of 1986 is the most significant
antipoverty legislation of the last decade. It is important not
only for the $5 billion a year in tax relief it provides to the
working poor but also because it reflects bipartisan support
for using the tax system to increase the incomes of the working
poor. 1 The consensus to aid the poor, which emerged during
debate over the 1986 Act, is particularly important because
the Reagan administration had previously disavowed using
tax reform for distributional purposes. In his 1982 Economic
Report, President Reagan stated:
As a result of the passage of the historic Economic
Recovery Tax Act of 1981, we have set in place a
fundamental reorientation of our tax laws. Rather
than using the tax system to redistribute existing
income, we have significantly restructured it to
encourage people to work, save and invest more
(p. 6).
The Economic Recovery Tax Act (ERTA), unlike the 1986
Act, did not aid the working poor. Quite to the contrary, it
actually increased their tax burdens. In addition to their
adverse treatment by ERTA, the working poor have been
adversely affected by two major economic and policy changes.
First, the economic stagnation of the past 15 years raised
poverty and income inequality well above the levels of the
mid-1970s. And, although the current recovery has been long
and robust, the poor have gained disproportionately little.
87
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Second, the Reagan budgetary retrenchment of the early
1980s reduced income transfers and social spending targeted
on the poor and the near-poor. As a result, many low-income
families who would have received benefits had social pro
grams not been cut receive no benefits today. And, despite the
beneficial effects of the 1986 Act, the poor still have not
regained their mid-1970s level of living.
Thus, since the early 1970s, changes in all three mechanisms
by which income is generated and redistributed the market,
income transfer programs, the tax system have tended to
increase poverty. As I show below, the prospects for affecting
the market-generated distribution of poverty or for reforming
existing income transfer programs are not good. Thus, if
poverty is to be reduced by 1990 to the level that existed in the
early 1970s, even if the economy continues to grow without
recession, we must move beyond the 1986 Tax Act. Although
the Act eliminated the personal income tax burden for most of
the poor, I conclude that further tax reforms offer the best
way to aid the poor particularly the working poor in the
late 1980s. Reforms such as those discussed below are feasible
and are preferred by both taxpayers and the poor to reforms
which would aid the working poor by taking them through the
welfare system. But first we must ask whether the reduction of
poverty is a legitimate goal to pursue.

Why Worry About Equity?
Why should an economists worry about the distribution of
income in general and poverty in particular? Shouldn't s/he be
interested in raising productivity and in achieving the most
from society's scarce resources? Shouldn't the pursuit of
efficiency be the primary goal? Isn't that why most of the
papers in this volume emphasize the effects of taxes and tax
reform on work, saving, capital accumulation, and economic
growth?
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My answer is "yes, but." If we were starting from an initial
situation in which the endowments that individuals brought to
the market had been attained in a market free of imperfections
such as discrimination, then the answer would be much more
emphatic for the "yes," and much more wavering for the
"but." Given an initial distribution of income, the market,
when all the assumptions of perfect competition are met, will
produce the most efficient allocation of scarce resources. The
goods to be produced and the resulting prices will determine
an efficient post-market distribution of income. If however, we
judge the initial distribution of endowments unfair, then we
may want to change the distribution of income that results
from the market, even if it has resulted from a perfectly
competitive market process.
This highly simplified textbook example is relevant to the
theme of this paper because the War on Poverty was premised
on the belief that both the initial endowments being brought
to the market by the poor and disadvantaged and how those
endowments were compensated were adversely affected by
market imperfections. If one accepts these underlying pre
mises of the War on Poverty as still relevant 20 years later,
then there remains a basis for public policies that provide
more equality and less poverty than currently exist.
A call for expanded use of the income tax to aid the poor
does not tell us how much more aid could promote equity
without impairing efficiency. Indeed two recent articles, Joel
Slemrod's "Do We Know How Progressive the Income Tax
System Should Be?" (1983) and Anthony Atkinson's "How
Progressive Should Income Tax Be?" (1983) review the liter
ature on the optimal income tax and reach no definitive
conclusions. The answer depends, first, on how we value
various degrees of inequality, that is, on our social welfare

90

function; second, on how responsive taxpayers are to mar
ginal tax rates; and third, on the distribution of endowments
that generate the pretax (market) distribution of income. In
general, Slemrod and Atkinson offer little more than the
boundaries of the trade-offs, guidelines that argue against
excessively high marginal tax rates without specifying the level
at which efficiency losses become large.
Alan Blinder (1982) is much less technical, but much more
eloquent. He concludes that:
. . . what this country needs now in the realm of
income distribution policy is exactly what it needs,
and has often been unable to get, in so many other
problem areas: An economic policy with a hard head
and a soft heart. A hard head to remind us of the
wondrous efficiency of the marketplace, and how
foolish it is to squander this efficiency without good
reason. And a soft heart to remind us that champi
oning the cause of society's underdogs has long
been, and remains one of the noblest functions of
government (p. 30).
My call for aiding the working poor through tax reform
rather than welfare reform is based on a review of the
efficiency effects of income transfer programs (see Danziger,
Havemen, and Plotnick, 1981).2 Because welfare programs
involve much higher marginal tax rates than those put into
place by the 1986 Tax Act, providing the same amount of aid
to the poor through tax reform would have a lower efficiency
cost than would providing it through welfare programs.

Why Not Rely on Economic Growth?
Why argue that the income tax be reformed further to
provide more aid for the poor? What about the importance of
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economic growth, which raises rather than redistributes in
come? Again, a careful review of the empirical literature
suggests that economic growth is necessary, but not sufficient
to aid many of the poor (see Gottschalk and Danziger, 1984;
Danziger and Gottschalk, 1986).
This issue was clearly recognized at the early stages of the
War on Poverty. In 1964, President Johnson stated:
We cannot, and need not wait for the gradual
growth of the economy to lift this forgotten fifth of
our nation above the poverty line. We know what
must be done and this nation of abundance can
surely afford to do it (p. 15).
Growth was to be an important tool, but only one of many, in
the fight against poverty.
The Johnson administration set in motion a vast series of
policy changes that placed the question "What does it do for
the poor?" at the top of the nation's domestic policy agenda.
Robert Lampman (1974) has argued that all government
programs and policies those related to education and trans
portation, for example, as well as those related to tax and
income maintenance programs had to explicitly address
their impact on the poor. In my view, a major barrier to
reducing poverty today is the fact that this question now is
asked only rarely.
When President Reagan announced his program for eco
nomic recovery in 1981, he stated:
The goal of this administration is to nurture the
strength and vitality of the American people by
reducing the burdensome, intrusive role of the fed
eral government; by lowering tax rates and cutting
spending; and by providing incentives for individu
als to work, to save, and to invest. It is our basic
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belief that only by reducing the growth of govern
ment can we increase the growth of the economy
(p. 1).
Thus, the question "What does it do for the poor?" was
replaced by the question "What does it do for incentives to
work and save?" Irving Kristol (1984), expanding on this
view, stated that:
The administration's social policy cannot be under
stood apart from its economic policy which is a
policy of growth not redistribution.
I believe that this shift in domestic priorities helps explain
why poverty declined rapidly as the economy grew in the late
1960s and why poverty has declined so slowly in the current
economic recovery.
Ronald Reagan is not the only one who has chosen not to
follow the path I am advocating and not to place antipoverty
policy via tax reform high on the agenda. Henry Aaron, in
"How to Make the President's Good Tax Reform Plan Even
Better," (1985) listed three serious problems with the federal
income tax: (1) a narrow tax base; (2) unnecessarily high
marginal tax rates that result from the narrowed tax base,
with both of these problems leading to distortions in con
sumption, saving, investment, and production; and (3) the
deficit, that is, too little tax revenue. Also, in Aaron and
Galper (1985) one finds much concern with horizontal eq
uity the equal treatment of those with equal incomes as a
way to reduce the "tax-induced distortions of labor supply,
saving, investments and risk taking," but little discussion of
vertical equity or the need to increase the progressivity of the
existing system.
The president wanted a bill that was both revenue neutral
and distributionally neutral that is tax reform that broadens

93

the tax base and lowers marginal tax rates in such a way as to
leave total revenue unchanged, that maintains the existing
degree of progressivity, and achieves horizontal equity. So if
Aaron only explicitly criticizes revenue neutrality, he must
implicitly accept distributional neutrality.
It is evident, therefore, that public policy discussion has
shifted away from a concern with poverty and inequality. Yet
recent trends in the level and distribution of family incomes
demonstrate a need for further reform of the personal income tax.

Recent Trends in Family Income
The period since the early 1970s has been not only one of
economic stagnation but also one of increasing inequality.
These macroeconomic changes contradicted two of the key
assumptions of the War on Poverty-Great Society planners.
First they thought the business cycle could be controlled by
the tools of Keynesian economics, so that poverty could be
fought against a background of healthy economic growth.
Second, they believed that in such an economy, with low
unemployment rates and with antidiscrimination policies and
education and training programs in place, everyone rich,
poor, and middle class would gain. At a minimum, it was
expected that economic growth would be proportional and
that all incomes would rise at about the same rate. At best,
income growth for the poor would exceed the average rate.
The facts demonstrating the failure of these assumptions
are clear, but explanations for the failure are much more
difficult. For most of the post-World War II period, family
income, adjusted for inflation, grew at an annual rate exceed
ing 3 percent per year. Since 1973, however, growth has
been minimal. There were three recessions 1974-75, 1979-80,
1981-82 and unemployment has remained at the 7 percent
level through the mid-1980s despite the longer-than-average
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length of the current recovery. By historical standards, the
current recovery is a very good one, but it is a recovery from
the very depressed levels of 1981, not an economic high-water
mark for the economy.
Table 1 compares the average annual growth in mean
family income, adjusted for inflation, for the 1949-1969,
1967-1973, and 1973-1984 periods. The two postwar decades
saw rapid growth in family income among both two-parent
and female-headed families with children. Mean family in
comes grew by about 6 percent per year. Between 1967 and
Table 1
Average Annual Rate of Growth of Real Family Income, 1949-1969,
Compared to 1967-1973 and 1973-1984

All Families with Children
White
Black
Hispanic
All Two-Parent Families
with Children
White
Black
Hispanic
All Female-Headed
Families with Children
White
Black
Hispanic

Annual Rate
1949-1969a
5.75%
5.00
8.34
5.88

Annual Rate
1967-1973b
2.25%
2.34
2.73
n.a.

Annual Rate
1973-1984C
- 0.75%
-0.69
-0.96
-0.63

6.17
6.18
10.41
6.39

2.96
2.86
4.67
n.a.

-0.28
-0.33
+ 0.35
-0.23

5.67
5.68
9.92
5.02

0.21
0.02
1.23
n.a.

-0.71
-0.71
-0.71
- 1.21

Source for 1949 and 1969 data: Computations by the authors from the computer tapes from
the 1950 and 1970 decennial Censuses.
Note While the Current Population Survey did not collect information on Hispanic origin in
1967, the decennial Censuses did collect those data.
aDefined as 100 x [(1969 real income 1949 real mcome)/1949 real income] -=- 20.
bDefined as 100 x [(1973 real income 1967 real income)/1967 real income]
6.
cDefined as 100 x [(1984 real income 1973 real income)/1973 real income] 4-11.
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1973, growth was about 3 percent per year for two-parent
families and less than 1 percent for female-headed families.
Growth per year was actually negative from 1973 to 1984 for
11 of the 12 rows in the table.
Changes in the mean indicate how the "typical" family
fared, but they obscure the differing patterns of income
changes that have occurred for families at different positions
in the income distribution. To see how families of "low,"
"middle," and "high" income have fared, we classify families
with children into one of five quintiles and compute the
percentage of income received by each of these fifths of
families. Changes in income shares provide a useful indicator
of changes in income inequality.
Just as with mean family income, the trend in quintile
shares since 1967 differs dramatically from the period covering
1949 to 1969. Chart 1 shows the change in the proportion of
aggregate income received by each quintile during the 19491969 and 1967-1984 periods. During the earlier period, the
income distribution shifted somewhat toward less inequality
as the lowest quintile increased its share and the shares of the
other four quintiles declined a small amount. The share of the
lowest 20 percent of all families with children increased by
1.02 percentage points while the share of the highest 20
percent declined by 0.25 percentage points. Between 1967 and
1984, inequality increased the income share of the bottom
three income quintiles declined and the share of the top two
increased. The share of the bottom quintile declined by 2.43
percentage points while the share of the top quintile increased
by 3.59 percentage points.
Table 2 shows the mean income in constant 1984 dollars for
each quintile of families with children. Also shown are the
mean incomes of these families and the percentage of persons
in them with income below the poverty line.3 The mean
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income in a quintile changes when its income share changes
and when the amount to be shared (aggregate income)
changes. For example, between 1967 and 1984, mean income
for all families increased by 4.1 percent, but the share of the
lowest quintile declined sufficiently to result in a 34.3 percent
decline, from $9347 to $6142. Over the same period, the mean
income of the highest quintile increased from $54,665 to
$62,198 because its share of the growing mean increased. A
typical family in the second quintile lost 13 percent ($18,950 to
$16,491) while one in the fourth quintile gained 11.1 percent
($33,276 to $36,967). Thus, there were shifts in income not
only from the poorest to the richest families, but also from
lower-middle-income to upper-middle-income families.
Table 2
Mean Income of Families with Children by Income Quintile
in Constant Dollars, 1967-1984 (1984) dollars)
2

3

4

5

Mean of
All
Families

$18,950
20,678
19,179
16,491

$25,602
28,988
28,855
25,836

$33,276
38,796
38,203
36,967

$54,665
63,258
61,256
62,198

$28,369
32,206
31,138
29,527

-13.0
-20.2

+0.9
-10.9

+ 11.1
-4.7

+ 13.8
-1.7

+4.1
-8.3

Mean Income of Quintile:
1
All Families
with Children
$9,347
1967
1973
9,308
8,057
1979
6,142
1984
Percentage Change,
-34.3
1967-1984
-34.0
1973-1984

Percentage
Poor3
13.5
11.4
12.7
17.4
+28.9
+ 52.6

"Percentage of all persons in these families with incomes below the official poverty line.

With mean incomes declining and inequality increasing, it
comes as no surprise that poverty rates increased between
1973 and 1984. The last column of Table 2 shows the
incidence of poverty using the federal government's official
definition of poverty. Poverty for all persons living in families
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with children declined between 1967 and 1973, increased
somewhat between 1973 and 1979, and then increased rapidly
between 1979 and 1984.4
What has happened in the past 15 years is clear—income
growth has been disappointing on average, and poverty and
inequality have increased. The reasons put forward for these
disappointing economic developments can be catalogued as
resulting from demographic changes, from economic changes,
or from government policy changes. All have been advocated
as the primary causal factor by one or more analysts. My own
view is that each has probably been important, but that we do
not have enough evidence to carefully apportion the blame.
Let me merely list some of these factors:
• Demographic changes. The baby-boom generation surged
into the labor market, as did wives. The economy created
many new jobs, but wage rates were often low. The ratio of
female to male wages did not rise despite the occupational
and experience gains by many women. Unemployment
rates remained high. Divorce rates increased as did the
percentage of children born out of wedlock.
• Oil price shocks. These price changes first caused rapid
inflation and severe economic dislocations in oil-importing
areas of the nation; then, deflation and dislocation in
oil-producing areas.
• Changes in industrial structure. Manufacturing employment
declined; employment in service industries increased. Inter
national competition and an aging domestic capital stock
contributed to these changes.
• Disincentives due to government programs. Because govern
ment benefits increased at the same time employment
opportunities decreased, some workers who would have
taken low-wage jobs dropped out of the labor force and
drew on government benefits instead.5
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The Redistributive Effects of the Personal
Income Tax, 1964-1985
While the income distribution was moving slowly toward
greater equality in the two post-World War II decades, so was
the personal income tax. Minarik (1985) notes that the two
most important devices promoting this trend were the intro
duction of the minimum standard deduction in 1964 and the
earned income tax credit in 1975. Progressivity also increased
for the unintended reason that inflation was pushing middleand upper-middle-class taxpayers into higher and higher
marginal tax brackets. Many analysts believe that these higher
marginal tax rates produced great dissatisfaction with the
personal income tax and contributed importantly to the
popularity of President Reagan's goal of reduced taxation.
Okner's (1979) simulation analysis shows the total impact of
the tax cuts of 1964, 1969, and 1975 to have been moderately
progressive. The top 10 percent of tax filers received about 10
percent of the 1964 cuts, 1 percent of the 1969 cuts, and actually
paid increased taxes after the 1975 tax cut. Congress rejected,
however, a progressive 1978 Carter administration tax-cut pro
posal. In its place, the 1978 cut Congress enacted allocated only
about 5 percent of the tax cut to the bottom 50 percent of
taxpayers, and about half to the top 10 percent.
Okner and Bawden (1983) show that while the 1981 Eco
nomic Recovery Tax Act (ERTA) reduced total tax revenues
by a much larger amount than the 1978 cut, the distribution of
the cuts was similar. The 1981 cuts were mostly proportional
with respect to taxes paid. Because a proportional tax cut does
not aid low-income households which pay no taxes, the 1981
cuts were regressive with respect to household incomes.
While ERTA addressed the problem of high marginal tax
rates by cutting the top tax rate to 50 percent on all forms of
income and by proportionally cutting all other rates, it clearly
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reversed the pro-poor tilt of all the post-1964 tax changes.
According to Minarik:
... the 1981 tax law can be judged unambiguously,
at least by our post-1964 standards, to have been
unfair to the poor; taxes of sub-median-income
families have gone up since 1980, while the taxes of
the better off went down (p. 41).
The anti-poor effects of the 1981 tax law, in marked contrast
to the pro-poor effects of the 1986 Act, were not explicitly
discussed in Congress.
The tilt toward the poor and near-poor up to 1975, and the
tilt away from them between 1975 and 1985 are evident in
Table 3, which is adapted from Steuerle and Wilson (1986).
The first six columns show the average and marginal income
tax rates for a four-person family with income at one-half the
median income and at the poverty line, for selected years
between 1950 and 1985, and projections for 1990. Column 7
shows the total (employer plus employee) payroll tax rates
that might be added to both the average and marginal rates if
one were to examine the combined effects of federal taxes.
In the case of the federal personal income tax, 1975 marks
the year of its most progressive treatment of the poor. This
was the year in which the earned income tax credit (EITC),
which subsidizes the earnings of low-income families with
children, was introduced. In the next decade, all three major
pro-poor devices in the personal income tax were severely
eroded by inflation—the EITC, the minimum standard deduc
tion (also known as the zero bracket amount), and the
personal exemption. For example, in 1975, because of the
EITC, a family of four at the poverty line received a federal
income tax credit of $250 (-4.55 percent of $5497). By 1985,
this family paid $370 in income taxes (3.37 percent of
$10,988), for an increase of $620. If one adds the increased
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social security taxes over this decade, then the increased tax
burden is about equal to the amount of food stamps the
poverty-line family of four could have received in 1985. (But
food stamps do not fully offset the taxes of all of the poor
because some families at the poverty line are ineligible for
food stamps due to asset limits or other administrative rules,
and others fail to apply for them.)
As discussed in the next section, by 1990, the average tax
rate will again be negative for this poverty-line family because
all three pro-poor devices—the standard deduction, the per
sonal exemption, and the EITC were increased and indexed to
inflation by the 1986 Act. Also, the marginal tax rate in 1990
will drop back to the 1975 level.
Table 3
Average and Marginal Income Tax Rates for Four-Person Families*
Income at One-half the Median
Income at Poverty Line
Social
Average Marginal
Average Marginal Security
Tax Rateb
Income
Rate
Rate
Income
Rate
Rate
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(6)
(7)
(5)
1950
$1,838
0.00%
0.0%
$2,435
0.0%
3.00%
0.00%
3,148
0.15
20.0
1960
20.0
3,025
2.13
6.00
5,583
4.65
15.0
1970
14.0
3,966
1.94
9.60
7,924
422
17.0
1975
10.0
5,497
-4.55
11.70
6.02
18.0
1980
12,166
26.5
8,416
-0.66
12.16
16,423
6.57
14.0
1985
24.2
14.10
10,988
3.37
-535
1990C
21,643
10.0
5.57
15.0
13,117
15.30
Source: Adapted from Steuerle and Wilson (1986).
aA negative rate implies that the earned income tax credit exceeded the tax liability.
bEmployer plus employee share.
cSteuerle and Wilson's projection

Table 3 also shows that a family at one-half the median (a level
in 1985 that was about 150 percent of the poverty line) was aided
only slightly by the 1986 Act. Its average tax rate in 1990 will be
midway between the 1975 and 1985 average rates. But the
difference in rates between 1985 and 1990 is only 1 percent of
family income for those at one-half the median, while it is almost
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9 percent for the family at the poverty line. This result reinforces
my view that further tax relief should be targeted on the
low-income population.
The data presented thus far make it clear that the trend toward
greater poverty and income inequality did not begin with the
election of Ronald Reagan. In fact, much of the damage on both
the income side and tax side occurred because of the high rates
of inflation of the late 1970s. Inflation eroded the value of the
pro-poor income transfers (which, except for those to the aged,
were not indexed to prices) and the pro-poor components of the
personal income tax. But the trends were unabated under
Reagan, even though inflation slowed, because transfers were cut
as part of the budgetary retrenchment and ERTA did nothing to
correct the past or prevent further erosion of the pro-poor tax
components.
That the recent tax changes have been quantitatively impor
tant can be seen in Table 4, which shows Census Bureau data
that account for all taxes paid. Unlike the data presented thus
far, these data allow us to break the increased inequality in the
income share of households between 1980 and 1983 into two
components. The first, shown in column 5, is due to changes in
money income before taxes, reflecting (1) changes in cash income
transfer programs, (2) results from recession, and (3) other
economic factors. The second component, shown in column 6,
reflects changes in state and local as well as federal income and
payroll taxes.
The total difference between 1980 and 1983 in after-tax
income shares, shown in column 7, reveals that each of the
bottom four quintiles lost ground over this three-year period.
The top quintile increased its income share by 1.4 percentage
points, which amounts to a net increase of about $2000 per
household. The decline in the income share of the first quintile
was due entirely to pretax income changes. The declines for the
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other three were splint between pretax changes and tax changes.
About one-third of the increased income share of the highest
quintile was due to tax changes.
Unpublished tabulations from the Congressional Budget Of
fice show a similar effect of federal tax changes on poverty. They
show that in 1979, 675,000 people were taken into poverty by
federal taxes; by 1984, this number had increased to 2,426,000.
Thus, a significant portion of the trend toward greater poverty
and inequality in the period since the mid-1970s can be attrib
uted to either direct government tax and transfer policy changes
or to the failure of government policy to respond to poor
economic performance. Although precise data that fully account
for changes in taxes paid and all types of noncash transfers and
employer-provided fringe benefits received are unavailable, it is
probably the case that the distribution of after-tax income is
more unequal today than at any time in the past 30 years.
Table 4
Percentage Share of Aggregate Income Received by Each Fifth
of Households, before and after Taxes, 1980 and 1983
Difference Between 1980 and
1983 Shares Due to:
1983
1980
Before
After
Before
After
Before
Tax
Tax
Total
Taxes Changes3 Changes5 Changes0
Taxes
Taxes
Taxes
Quintile
(4)
(3)
(2)
(1)
(5)
(7)
(6)
-02
-02
4.7%
0.0
3.9%
49%
4.1%
Lowest fifth
-0.5
-0.2
-0.3
11.1
99
11 6
10.2
Second fifth
-0.6
-02
-0.4
16.4
17.3
17.9
16.8
Third fifth
-0.3
-0.2
-01
24.8
24.7
25 1
248
Fourth fifth
+ 1.4
420
+0.5
+09
442
45.1
40.6
Highest fifth
0.0
0.0
100.0
00
100.0
1000
100.0
All fifths'1
Department
S.
U
1983,
for
11;
p
(1983),
Source: For 1980, U.S Department of Commerce
of Commerce (1985), p. 3.
aDefined as (column 3 - column 1).
bDefined as (column 4 - column 3)—(column 2 - column 1)
cDefined as (column 6 + column 5), which is equal to (column 4 - column 2).
dMay not sum to 100.0 or 0.0 because of rounding
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The Tax Reform Act of 1986
The major goal of the 1986 Tax Reform Act was to lower
tax rates and broaden the tax base. The law now has only two
tax brackets—15 percent and 28 percent (although because of
the surcharge and phaseout of the personal exemption at
higher income levels, some taxpayers will face an effective rate
of 33 percent). And many tax preferences were reduced or
eliminated. The 1986 Act departed somewhat from distribu
tional neutrality by raising corporate taxes. As a result, it
provided disproportionate tax relief to the working poor while
approximating revenue neutrality.
The major changes benefiting the poor are the increase in
the personal exemption from $1080 to $2000 by 1989; an
increase in the standard deduction for joint filers from $3670
to $5000 and for single heads of households from $2480 to
$4400; and an increase in the maximum earned income tax
credit from $550 to $800 by 1987. All of these devices are also
indexed for inflation. As a result, about six million poor and
near-poor taxpayers will be removed from the tax rolls.
Except for the poor, however, there will be little change in
the overall progressivity of the income tax. This is because the
expanded tax base increased progressivity to about the same
extent as the reduced number of tax brackets lowered progres
sivity.6 Table 5 shows recent estimates of the distributional
effects of the 1986 Act (U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on
Taxation, 1986). For each income class, column (1) shows the
average tax change; column (2), the average 1986 tax liability;
and column (3) the percentage change in tax liability. Since the
percentage reduction in tax liability generally falls as income
rises, the overall effect is progressive.
There are, however, very large differences within income
classes. Minarik (1986) refers to the Act as a "massive
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Table 5
Distributional Effects of the Tax Reform Act of 1986
Income Class
(thousands of
1986 dollars)

Less than $10
10-20
20-30
30-40
40-50
50-75
75-100
100-200
Above 200
All filers

Estimated
Mean
Tax Change
(1)

$-39
-200
-220
-273
-486
-150
-176
-612
-3,362
$-194

Estimated
Mean
1986 Tax
Liability
(2)

Percentage
Change in Tax
Liability41
(3)

$21
695
2,018
3,254
4,849
8,388
14,293
27,353
135,101
$ 2,982

-65.1%
-22.3
-9.8
-7.7
-9.1
-1.8
-1.2
-2.2
-2.4
-6.1%

Source: U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Taxation (1986).
aDefined as column 1, tax change, divided by 1986 tax liability that would have resulted if Tax
Act had not been passed times 100.

reshuffling," that is, as one primarily promoting horizontal
equity. He points out that in the highest income brackets, the
net change shown in Table 5 results from a situation in which
about 45 percent of filers in the highest income bracket face
tax increases of about $50,000, while the remaining 55 percent
have tax reductions of about $53,000.7 Taxpayers with similar
incomes will now pay tax rates that are much more similar
than before because of the expanded tax base and the reduced
number of tax brackets.
Under the new law, many fewer people will be taxed into
poverty by the federal income tax and many more families
with children will receive credits from the expanded EITC.
Yet these changes will do little to offset the large increase in
poverty and inequality that characterizes the period since
1973. It is against this background of economic and policy
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changes that I advocate further tax reforms targeted on the
poor and near-poor.

Some Further Tax Reforms
What else would I do to reform the income tax in such a
way as to provide greater assistance to the working poor and
near-poor without taking them through the welfare system?
Ideally, I would replace the personal exemption with a per
capita refundable credit. Lerman (1985) proposes an annual
$600 refundable per capita credit which would be made
available only to those who do not itemize deductions. Such a
credit would be administered in the same fashion as the
Internal Revenue Service currently administers the EITC.
With a marginal tax bracket of 15 percent, a $600 credit would
be equal to an exemption of about $4000; for the 28 percent
bracket it equals an exemption of $2143. Thus almost all of
the additional costs associated with the credit would be
targeted on taxpayers in the 15 percent bracket. Obviously, a
refundable per capita credit better targets foregone revenue on
those with lower incomes than would be the case if the same
amount of revenue was foregone by raising the personal
exemption.8
An even more ambitious proposal (Garfinkel and Haveman, 1983) would raise the value of the per capita refundable
credit, and in return replace both the personal exemption and
the Food Stamp program. The rationale is that such credits
can effectively target funds upon the poor, lower their mar
ginal tax rate, and avoid the stigmatization of recipients and
the higher administrative costs of welfare programs. For
example, a family of four with no other income is currently
eligible for about $4000 per year in Food Stamps and faces a
benefit reduction rate (marginal tax rate) in that program of
33 percent. With a refundable credit of $1000 per person, the
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family with no other income is equally well off, and the only
marginal tax rate comes from the payroll tax, not the sum of
the payroll tax and Food Stamp rates.9 Of course, since the
current personal exemption is not refundable, and many poor
and near-poor families do not participate in the Food Stamp
program, such a change would require additional revenues.
The lower marginal tax rates in the reformed income tax,
however, provide a more efficient mechanism for raising
revenue to aid low-income families than did the old rates.
With the lower rates, the work disincentive effects of raising
taxes decline. Assume, for example, that these refundable
credits will be financed by broadening the tax base—say, by
taxing the employers' contribution for health insurance. With
only two brackets, a smaller percentage of the population will
be shifted into a higher marginal tax bracket by this basebroadening than would have been so shifted under the
pre-1986 rate structure. For most people then, any basebroadening will have only an income effect (reduced income)
promoting greater work effort; only a small number will have
an altered substitution effect (since few change tax brackets)
promoting lower work effort. For the beneficiaries of such
expanded credits, the income effect will lead to less work but
the substitution effect will lead to more work because the
credits will take the place of a welfare program, which had
higher marginal tax rates.
A second reform would make the child care tax credit
refundable. The current nonrefundable credit allows couples,
when both spouses work, and working single parents, to
partially offset work-related child care costs. Only about 1
percent of the poor two-parent families and 6 percent of poor
single-parent families make use of the nonrefundable credit
(Steuerle and Wilson, 1986). One the other hand, higherincome taxpayers receive credits up to $960 if they have more
than one child and if they spend at least $4800 on care.
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The credit begins at 30 percent for families with incomes
below $10,000. Consider the case of a single mother of one
child who works part time, earns $5.00 per hour for 1500
hours per year, and spends $1.50 per hour, or $2250, to keep
her child in a day care center while she works. If this is her
only income, she will not have a positive income tax liability
(indeed the expanded EITC will offset a portion of her social
security taxes). Her potential child care credit—$675, or 30
percent of $2250—is thus of no value to her because it is not
refundable. Refunding this credit would not only raise her net
income, it would also make welfare recipiency less attractive.

Conclusion
In sum, I have argued that the 1986 Tax Act was an
important addition to antipoverty policy. However, in the late
1980s, inequality of family income is continuing to increase,
and poverty is only slowly declining, despite a robust eco
nomic recovery. The pro-poor extensions of tax reform that I
have proposed would not threaten any of the efficiency
accomplishments of the recent tax reform and would have
much smaller work and family disincentive effects than would
any alternative plan to aid the poor through the welfare
system.
The Tax Reform Act has helped to refocus attention on the
question "What does it do for the poor?" The further reforms
suggested here reemphasize this question without rejecting the
Reagan-era question "What does it do for incentives to work
and save?"
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NOTES
1. As an indication of the relative magnitude of the tax relief, note that the
total cost of Food Stamp benefits is estimated at $10.9 billion in fiscal year
1987.

Ill
2. This review suggests that total spending on all major income transfer
programs reduced annual hours of work in the economy by about 4.8
percent in the late 1980s. One should not conclude from this that marginal
changes in transfer programs would cause large efficiency losses.
3. The federal government's official measure of poverty provides a set of
income cutoffs adjusted for household size, the age of the head of the
household, and the number of children under age 18. (Until 1981, sex of
the head and farm/nonfarm residence were other distinctions.) The cutoffs
provide an absolute measure of poverty that specifies in dollar terms
minimally decent levels of consumption. To make them represent the same
purchasing power each year, the official poverty thresholds are updated
yearly by an amount corresponding to the change in the Consumer Price
Index. In 1985, the poverty lines ranged from $7231 for a family of two to
$22,083 for a family of 9 or more; the line for a family of four was $10,989.
4. Care must be taken in interpreting the official poverty data. When the
poverty thresholds were set in the mid-1960s, the poor received few in-kind
transfers and paid little in taxes. Therefore, one could at that time
legitimately compare cash income with the official poverty lines to obtain
a fairly accurate picture of resources available to meet the families' needs.
During the late 1960s and early 1970s, however, noncash transfer benefits
increased rapidly. While these noncash benefits represented only 12
percent of outlays on income-tested programs in 1966, the figure had risen
to about 70 percent by 1983. Clearly a better measure of a family's ability
to meet its needs should include the value of in-kind programs.
Likewise, taxes detract from the availability of resources to meet needs.
If taxes had not increased very much over this period they could be
ignored, since the original poverty definition was based on income before
taxes.
Unfortunately, we do not have a consistent time series for poverty which
adjusts for both taxes and the value of in-kind transfers. Nonetheless,
while the inclusion of in-kind transfers would reduce the extent of poverty
in any single year, and the subtraction of taxes paid would increase it, they
would not significantly alter the trends discussed here.
5. My own view is that the disincentive effects of government programs
have been exaggerated in the media and in such books as Charles Murray's
Losing Ground (1984). For a review, see Danziger and Weinberg (1986).
6. The issue of increasing the progressivity of the income tax is completely
separate from the move from multiple tax brackets to only a few brackets.
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Hall and Rabushka (1985) show this explicitly in The Flat Tax, by
presenting a table that shows various combinations of an adult exemption
and a marginal tax rate that raise the same revenue. For example, while
their basic plan contains an adult allowance of $5500 and a rate of 19
percent, one could choose an equal-cost more progressive plan with an
allowance of $6600 and a rate of 23 percent.
7. Minarik's estimate was made before the tax bill was finalized. These
numbers are, thus, merely suggestive of the reshuffling created by the Act.
8. For the poor, a refundable credit is clearly preferable to the exemption.
Consider a family with no tax liability under current law—that is, all of its
exemptions and deductions exactly offset its tax liability. Now assume that
the family has another child. The additional exemption is worth nothing if
family income is unchanged. However, the family would receive the full
value of the refundable credit.
9. Depending on the amount of earnings, however, the relevant compar
ison may be between the 33 percent rate under Food Stamps and a 22
percent rate: the sum of the employee share of the payroll tax and the first
bracket rate of 15 percent. This is because, under the exemption, the
marginal income tax is zero until a tax threshold is reached which equals
the sum of the standard deduction and the exemptions, while under a per
capita credit, the tax threshold falls to the standard deduction only.
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